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Australia’s retirement income system is well-regarded interna-
tionally, both in terms of providing for a decent and adequate 
life in retirement and the system’s governance. 
However, two trends, our ageing population and decreasing 
housing affordability, mean the structure and policies in place 
now may not be robust enough to ensure Australians can 
retire comfortably in the future and are likely to put unsustainable fiscal pressure 
on the Federal Budget. 
The 2015 Intergenerational Report found that Australia’s aged dependency 
ratio (the number of people over 65 for every working-age person 15 to 64) is 
expected to double over the next 40 years, meaning there will be significantly 
fewer taxpayers supporting a growing demand for pensions and services includ-
ing health and aged care. 
In addition, the rate of home ownership is continuing to decline among young 
Australians. 
This is relevant to retirement policy because currently retirement is funded through 
a combination of: the publicly-funded Age Pension, superannuation and voluntary 
savings. Owner-occupied housing – essentially the family home – is a key com-
ponent of voluntary savings. 
Older Australian households have a high rate of home ownership (currently 85 per 
cent), contributing to the current lack of concern about older renters. 
However, a lack of housing affordability now is likely to mean that over the next 40 
years more people will retire without owning their home and an increasing number 
of retirees are likely to be at the mercy of the private rental market.  
Foreword
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We know from CEDA’s report Addressing entrenched disadvantage in Australia, 
released in April this year, that between 1 and 1.5 million Australians already live 
in poverty and the elderly, particularly those who do not own their home, are an 
at-risk group. In fact, the overall poverty rate of older people in Australia is three 
times the OECD average, and one of the highest. 
In light of these trends, the current structure of our retirement system needs to be 
reviewed or we run the risk of more Australians living in poverty in retirement.
CEDA is recommending that in addition to reviewing taxation arrangements on 
superannuation and owner-occupied home mortgages, superannuation funds 
should be able to be invested in owner-occupied housing. 
We recognise that each of these policy recommendations comes with their own 
issues, for example making mortgage repayments pre-tax could contribute to 
pushing house prices up. However, with the right combination of policy levers 
and checks and balances they are genuine options that should be explored given 
the trends we are now facing.
Confirming the objectives of the system would also go a long way to alleviating 
the current confusion among the public, industry and the government. 
The constant tinkering around retirement income policies makes it difficult for 
those planning their retirement to make informed decisions about how best to 
fund their retirement. 
Uncertainty may also prevent people from responding to policy incentives if they 
are unconvinced that the policies will be in place for a long time. 
What we need is a frank, bipartisan review of our country’s expectations for our 
retirement system and the changes necessary to ensure it can continue to live up 
to those expectations for future generations.
I would like to thank the contributing authors and the CEDA Advisory Group for 
the quality of their contributions, input and oversight.
I hope, as always, that you find this CEDA publication an informative and useful 
resource.
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin 
Chief Executive 
CEDA
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Introduction
This policy perspective evaluates Australia’s retirement income system 
and assesses the respective roles of superannuation and government. The 
authors’ contributions each focus on different aspects of Australia’s retirement 
income system – its history including the impacts of recent reforms, the many 
challenges including associated market failures, international benchmarking, 
and the role of home equity in the system. 
Contributions
Chapter 1: Historical development and recent reforms 
Dr Diana Warren describes Australia’s current retirement system and summarises 
the historical development of Australia’s three-pillar retirement income system: 
the Age Pension, the superannuation system and private voluntary savings. She 
concludes that the inconsistency in government regulation and retirement income 
system policies makes it difficult for Australians to make informed decisions and 
to adequately plan for their retirement. She calls for the existing system to be 
simplified and for greater policy stability and certainty. 
Chapter 2: Fixing the superannuation policy mess 
Professor Stephen King and Dr Rodney Maddock discuss five market failures and 
behavioural biases (myopia, agency, taxation, free riding, and risk aversion) that 
underlie the retirement savings system in Australia, and explore the implications 
of their findings for public policy. They conclude that compulsory superannuation 
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should be seen as a way to help people fund their retirement and not as a way to 
save the government money. They also propose making superannuation an after-
tax payment to address equity concerns and they recommend similar treatment 
for real and financial assets. 
Chapter 3: Australia’s retirement system. How does it stack 
up? How can we improve it? 
Dr David Knox compares the pension systems of 25 countries across the world 
(including Australia), and identifies potential areas of improvement. He finds 
that Australia has one of the world’s best systems, rating second overall. His 
recommendations include: confirming and legislating retirement income system 
objectives (a reasonable pension for the poor and the provision of reasonable 
retirement incomes to maintain living standards); increased focus on the provision 
of lifetime retirement incomes; and encouraging workers not to retire early but to 
remain in the labour force.
Chapter 4: Living income- and asset-poor in retirement
Dr Judith Yates discusses the critical contribution made by housing in sustaining 
living standards and alleviating poverty in retirement. She finds that this is par-
ticularly prominent in Australia due to our current relatively high home ownership 
rates. Falling home ownership rates among younger Australians could lead in 
the future to more people in retirement living in poverty. In the short-term, she 
recommends increasing the Commonwealth Rent Assistance, but also suggests 
necessary longer term reforms such as improving the supply of affordable rental 
housing and improving housing affordability. 
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Executive Summary
Australia’s three-pillar approach to retirement income is internationally well 
regarded. However, many Australians currently approaching retirement face 
potential poverty, especially if they do not own their own homes. Australia’s 
aged dependency ratio (the number of people over 65 for every working-
age person 15 to 64) is expected to double over the next 40 years, and the 
Australian Government recognises that current arrangements are fiscally 
unsustainable. 
Many Australians nearing retirement age today have not had compulsory super-
annuation for their entire working lives. While this issue will abate as the system 
matures, Australians are still worried they are not saving enough to live comfort-
ably in retirement.
Home ownership is a growing retirement issue. Renters not only have no owner-
occupied housing wealth, but they also have considerably lower holdings of 
other forms of wealth. In younger households, the net wealth of owners is around 
double that of renters. In older households, the net wealth of owners is around six 
times higher than that of renters. 
While home ownership among current retirees is up to 85 per cent, increasing 
numbers of retirees do not own their own dwellings and live at the mercy of the 
expensive private rental market in low economic resource (LER) households. The 
number of older income- and asset-poor households is likely to grow rapidly over 
the next 40 years, and many are likely to be in the private rental market.
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
9
An asset is an asset
People build up assets while they are working. For most Australians, the main 
forms of lifetime savings are superannuation and owner-occupied housing. It 
is unhelpful to make sharp distinctions between financial assets (e.g. superan-
nuation) and real assets (e.g. housing). Both determine people’s retirement 
living standards, and it is arguable that both should be treated the same for tax 
purposes.
Compulsory superannuation should be seen as a way to help people fund their 
retirement – not as a way to save the government money. Of course, if retirees 
have enough resources, they will not need to access the pension thereby saving 
the government money – however, saving the government money should not be 
the primary objective. 
Superannuation carries taxation concessions which primarily benefit the rich, with 
the top 20 per cent of income earners accounting for 58 per cent of superan-
nuation tax concessions (including concessions on earnings). This is an equity 
concern. 
Compulsory contributions to superannuation should be paid out of people’s after-
tax income (or alternatively allow mortgage payments to be made from pre-tax 
income). This would allow two important components of retirement savings – 
superannuation and the family home – to be treated the same.
No place like home
Housing makes a critical contribution to sustaining the living standards of older 
households, especially those on low incomes. 
More than 70 per cent of renter households are single adult households. Of these, 
most are women. In 2011–12, more than one third of older LER renters were in 
the private rather than the public rental system.
Older renters are far more likely to experience persistent poverty than other 
households. They might go without meals, be unable to heat their homes, and be 
unable to afford leisure or hobby activities. Also, too often private rental is either 
unaffordable or inappropriate in terms of design or access to services. Many older 
renters are at risk of becoming homeless for the first time. The resultant incidence 
of housing stress and after-housing poverty is unacceptably high for older, lower-
income private renters.   
Despite growing need, the stock of low rent dwellings has been steadily declining 
for more than a generation. Since the mid-1990s, the absolute number of dwell-
ings in public rental has halved to four per cent of Australia’s total dwelling stock. 
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Current criteria for allocating social housing rate mental illness, addiction issues, 
physical disability, and domestic violence ahead of housing affordability problems. 
For more than 30 years, there have also been significant reductions in home own-
ership rates among successive cohorts of younger households. Home ownership 
rates in the future are unlikely to fully recover from their current 30+ year lows. 
As the number of renters increases, a growing share will end up in the private 
rental market with its escalating costs. Currently, the share of LER older house-
holds in the private rental market is less than 40 per cent (two of every five renter 
households). If there is no increase in the amount of public housing available for 
older people, the share could increase to almost 70 per cent (seven of every 10). 
If the proportion of older people living independently as renters remains the same 
as it has for the past 40 years, then the number of older renters will also more 
than double – from around 300,000 households in 2014 to more than 600,000 
in 2054. Presuming the proportion of older LER households remains the same, 
most of these older renters will be income- and asset-poor.  
Reform areas
Retirement income reforms underway around the world include increasing retire-
ment or pension eligibility ages; a greater focus on funding future benefits through 
increased contributions; improving the coverage of the private pension system; 
reducing the level of indexation for pensions; encouraging labour force participa-
tion at older ages; and a greater focus on governance, fees and regulation.
To engender long-term community confidence, benefits must be adequate; the 
system must be sustainable over the longer term; the system must be perceived 
to be fair and, above all, must be simple to understand. 
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The recommendations that follow consolidate and build on those of the con-
tributing authors, with the aim of informing policy that ensures a prosperous 
and dignified retirement for all Australians.
Recommendation I: Adopt clear and consistent 
objectives
There is disconnect and confusion among the public, industry and the govern-
ment regarding the objectives of the retirement income system. Some members 
of the public see the Age Pension as an entitlement; the finance industry is more 
concerned about the superannuation aspect of the system; and the government’s 
focus is on the associated expenditure and perceived fairness. 
To help Australians confidently plan their retirement, government should confirm 
and communicate clear and consistent retirement income system objectives. 
Any proposed policy reforms should reflect these objectives. Fiscal sustainability, 
while important, should not be the primary or only focus of the retirement income 
system. The primary objective should be to:
•	 Ensure that all Australians retire with dignity and decent living standards.
Within the system, the objectives should be to:
•	 Provide a social safety net for those Australians who cannot afford to save 
enough (or at all) for retirement; and
•	 Help people save for retirement and manage the associated financial and lon-
gevity risks.
Policy clarity would offer Australians peace of mind when planning for retirement. 
Recommendations
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Recommendation II: Recognise housing as the 
fourth pillar of the system
Owner-occupied housing (also known as the family home) is a key component 
of the third pillar of the retirement income system (voluntary private savings). 
However, the system should better recognise the extent to which owner-occupied 
housing contributes to household wealth and retirement liveability. People who do 
not own homes are exposed to the high-cost rental market and risk poverty in 
retirement. Home ownership continues to decline among young Australians, more 
of whom are expected to retire without owning a home.
The government should recognise the role of housing in poverty alleviation and in 
contributing to the objectives of providing for a decent retirement. It should:
•	 Allow first home buyers to access superannuation funds to purchase owner-
occupied housing; and
•	 Address housing affordability, including for rental and social housing.
Recommendation III: Address superannuation 
taxation inequity 
The government should reconsider providing taxation incentives for superannua-
tion whereby contributions up to a certain amount attract a concessional tax rate. 
This benefits high-income households the most, contributing to equity concerns. 
It also treats superannuation more favourably than other forms of retirement 
savings, such as the family home. With superannuation contributions already 
compulsory, taxation incentives are not needed. 
The government should redesign the retirement income system. It should:
•	 Mandate that superannuation contributions be made from after-tax (net) income; 
and
•	 Include the family home in the assets test for the Age Pension as part of the 
same reform. 
This reform would address equity concerns around taxation incentives, and would 
align the treatment of superannuation and housing – both critical determinants of 
a comfortable retirement. 
Given the importance of housing for retirement, another option would be to allow 
mortgage payments to be made pre-income tax. This would allow two important 
components of retirement savings – superannuation and the family home – to be 
treated the same.
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
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Recommendation IV: Provide innovative  
post-retirement products
The majority of retirees taking lump sum superannuation pay outs are using them 
to pay off mortgages, conduct home repairs, pay off debt, or otherwise invest 
towards future living costs. There is little evidence that discretionary consumption 
followed by reliance on the Age Pension is a problem. However, there is evidence 
that retirees are not confident managing their finances in retirement – they are 
prone to under-consume and save. 
Superannuation funds could provide products that offer longevity protection 
to help retirees better manage their funds and reduce under-consumption. 
Examples include:
•	 Income stream products, particularly, deferred lifetime annuities whereby 
income payments are delayed until a certain age is reached, that are innovative 
by for example being customised to a particular type of profession; or
•	 Group self-annuitisation (GSA) schemes, whereby funds are pooled and paid to 
survivors – either once they reach a certain age (potentially as income streams), 
or as a regular payment. 
More products would add to consumer choice, especially as the system contin-
ues to mature.
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
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Australians are living longer and enjoying more time in retirement than ever 
before. However, the ageing population has created concerns around the 
fiscal sustainability of the system, particularly the Age Pension, and there are 
growing concerns that Australians are not saving enough to contribute to their 
own comfortable retirement. 
The public policy debate around Australia’s retirement income system is currently 
dominated by the system’s rising costs and projections, and options for alleviat-
ing future budget demands. The 2015 Intergenerational Report: Australia in 2055, 
predicted that the aged dependency ratio – number of working-age persons for 
every person over 65 – will almost halve over the next 40 years.
CEDA overview
Sarah-Jane Derby 
CEDA SENIOR ECONOMIST
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In particular, the retirement system discourse has focused on changes to the 
retirement age and policies aimed at reducing dependence on the Age Pension, 
such as tweaking the assets test. 
While it is reasonable and responsible to concern ourselves with the growing 
system costs, it is not the only debate that policymakers need to have. 
The objectives of the retirement income system lack clarity. Until we know pre-
cisely what we want the system to achieve, and the role we want governments 
to play, it will remain a challenge to agree on the best policy settings for meeting 
the demands of our ageing society. Policymakers, the industry, and the public will 
also continue to be confused about the desired role of superannuation within the 
system, and how it should interact with the Age Pension. 
In this policy perspective, the authors assess the role of superannuation and the 
role of government in the retirement income system by looking at the market fail-
ures associated with retirement incomes, international benchmarking and the role 
of housing as a fourth pillar in the Australian system. 
The three pillars 
Australia is not alone in having to deal with an ageing population. Most advanced 
economies are grappling with the challenges of supporting their retired citizens, 
given low birth rates (partially offset in Australia by immigration) and rising life 
expectancies. 
The aged dependency ratio has been falling for decades. It declined from 7.3 
working-age people for each retired person in the mid-1970s to 4.5 today, and 
is predicted to reach 2.7 in the next 40 years.1 Fewer taxpayers supporting a 
growing number of retirees for longer periods, means funding Age Pensions will 
be a greater challenge. 
The good news is that Australia’s retirement income system is well-placed to 
deal with the problem. The system is internationally regarded as being one of the 
best in the world – it provides for a decent and adequate life in retirement, and is 
currently well-governed.2 In Chapter 1, Dr Diana Warren discusses the retirement 
income system in detail.
Australia’s three-pillar approach to retirement incomes was endorsed by the 
World Bank in 1993 as world best practice. The three pillars are: 
1. A basic publicly-funded pension;
2. A privately-provided pension; and
3. Voluntary savings.
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
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1.  The Age Pension is available to those aged 65 and over (gradually increasing 
to 67) subject to a means tests. The Age Pension is set at 25 per cent of 
average male total weekly earnings and is funded by taxpayers. Age Pension 
expenditure has risen from about 3.0 per cent of GDP in 1980 to about 3.3 
per cent today and is expected to increase to 3.8 per cent by 2055, assuming 
business-as-usual policies.3 However, Australia’s expenditure is relatively low 
compared to the OECD average, as shown in Figure 1.4 
In 1909, when the Age Pension was first introduced, Australians had to be at 
least 65 years old to qualify; yet post-retirement life expectancy was about 11 
years for men and 13 years for women.5 Today, we can expect to live for at 
least 20 years past the retirement age. Between 2017 and 2023, eligibility for 
the Age Pension will rise from 65 to 67 years of age. The eligibility age for men 
has been the same since 19096, despite life expectancy in retirement almost 
doubling, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 1 
AGED PENSION EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF GDP; SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
Source: OECD
Figure 2 
LIFE EXPECTANCy AT RETIREmENT
Source: ABS Cat 3105.0 and Cat 3302.0
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2.  The superannuation system. The compulsory superannuation guarantee 
charge (paid by employers on behalf of their employees) is currently at 9.5 per 
cent (gradually increasing to 12 per cent by 2025). Meanwhile, funds can be 
accessed at 55 years of age (gradually rising to 60). The government offers 
incentives within the superannuation system in terms of tax concessions and 
co-contributions, meaning the system carries a budgetary cost.
The government introduced compulsory superannuation in the early 1990s 
partly in response to concerns around the ageing population and adequacy 
in retirement. Superannuation funds are generally managed by the private 
sector. Prior to its introduction, superannuation was mostly confined to the 
public sector and the high end of the commercial sector. Making it compulsory 
extended it to an almost universal coverage.7 The system is not yet mature, 
i.e. today’s retirees have not had compulsory superannuation for their entire 
working lives. As the system continues to age, some of the concerns around 
people retiring without adequate income should abate.
3.  Voluntary savings, including anything from cash to other assets such as 
shares. Housing, particularly owner-occupied housing, or the family home, 
is an important part of this pillar. Government’s involvement is indirect – for 
example, through tax raised on interest, and on capital gains tax exemptions 
on the family home. 
In 2005, the World Bank extended the three-pillar approach to the following more 
comprehensive five-pillar approach:
1. A government-funded basic pension, universal or means-tested
2. Compulsory publicly-managed pension with private contributions
3. Compulsory privately-managed pension with private contributions
4. Voluntary privately-managed pension with private contributions
5. Voluntary savings outside of the system
The Australian retirement income system has all but one of the five pillars, namely 
Pillar 2, a compulsory publicly-managed pension plan with private contributions 
from employers and individuals, common in many European countries.8
The silver lining
In Chapter 3, Dr David Knox compares the pension systems of 25 countries 
(including Australia), using more than 40 factors. The analysis grades coun-
tries according to the adequacy, sustainability and integrity of their respective 
retirement funding systems. Despite not having a social security arrangement 
for pensions, our retirement income system still fares well on the global scale. 
Australia ranks second overall and does well on each sub-index (adequacy, sus-
tainability and integrity). 
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
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Based on this international benchmark, for Australia to improve our system further 
at least 50 per cent of retirement benefits would need to be taken as an income 
stream. One of the arguments for income streams is that they minimise the risk 
of retirees running out of money too quickly. Another is that they address suspi-
cions that retirees are withdrawing lump sums, spending them on discretionary 
consumption such as holidays, and then reverting to dependence on the Age 
Pension (known as drawdown behaviour and referred to colloquially as ‘double 
dipping’). This concern is exacerbated because Australians can access superan-
nuation years before they reach the qualifying age for the pension. 
The double dipping debate is rife in Australia but 
the fear does not stand up to scrutiny. There is no 
evidence of it being a genuine problem. On the 
contrary, the evidence suggests that lump sum 
withdrawals are concentrated among those with low 
superannuation balances9 (the median value of lump 
sums being about $20,000) and these are primarily 
used to reduce debt (mortgages in particular) and 
to invest in other assets.10 Only about eight per cent 
of lump sum withdrawals are used for discretionary consumption.11 Mandating 
income streams for those with such low balances would not provide a signifi-
cant income flow. Furthermore, people on low balances would still qualify for the 
Age Pension regardless, making the double dipping argument invalid in those 
instances. 
There is no evidence that Australian retirees are overspending in retirement. In 
fact, retirees are so risk averse that they underspend and even save.12 A third of 
Age Pension recipients are net savers, and another third (typically homeowners) 
maintain their savings.13 
However, managing longevity is proving a challenge for retirees. More post-retire-
ment products could help retirees better manage their finances and help address 
under-consumption. Better and more innovative products would also improve our 
international performance and would add to consumer choice. 
Options include products with a strong focus on lifetime retirement income, such 
as deferred lifetime annuities whereby the income stream payments are deferred 
until a certain age is reached. Innovative superannuation providers looking 
beyond a one-size-fits-all approach could also develop customised products for 
different professional groups. Group self-annuitisation (GSA) schemes are also 
growing in popularity, whereby funds are pooled and paid to survivors – either 
once they reach a certain age (including as potential income streams) or as 
regular payments. 
“ The double-dipping debate is rife in 
Australia but the fear does not stand 
up to scrutiny. …Only about eight per 
cent of lump sum withdrawals are used 
for discretionary consumption.”
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The super challenge
The good international standing of Australia’s retirement income system is some-
what at odds with the local policy debate. This is partly because our compulsory 
superannuation system is not yet mature. It is also because, more than 20 years 
after its introduction, a lack of consensus prevails around its objectives. The 
objectives were clear when compulsory superannuation was first introduced, but 
this is no longer the case. 
The retirement income system’s primary objective should be to ensure that 
Australians retire in dignity with decent living standards – implying that the system 
should provide reasonable income to maintain retirees’ living standards, with a 
safety net for those who are unable to provide for themselves. While this principle 
seems straightforward, intense debate continues around the system’s objective 
and the desired roles of, in particular superannuation and the Age Pension. 
The Age Pension accounts for about 10 per cent of government expenditure 
growing annually at about four per cent14, raising concerns around its fiscal sus-
tainability. The government’s priority is to return to budget surplus as soon as 
possible. Hence, its objective is to contain the costs of the Age Pension15, as 
reflected in its recent tightening of the means test for Age Pension eligibility. 
On the other hand, many Australians view the Age Pension as a right rather 
than a safety net – an entitlement for having paid tax their entire lives. This view 
appears to be shifting, possibly as increasing numbers of people are covered by 
superannuation. Today, only 11 per cent of women and 13 per cent of men rate 
eligibility for the Age Pension as the most important determinant when timing their 
retirement.16 
The primary objective of the Age Pension should be to provide a social safety net 
for all Australians who need it. Those able to support themselves in a comfortable 
retirement should not need to access the safety net. Containing the costs of the 
Age Pension should not be a primary objective. 
Similarly, the primary objective of superannuation should be to help adequately 
fund people’s retirement. That is, to help retirees manage the associated financial 
and longevity risks, including helping Australians manage their consumption and 
saving habits across their lifetime to optimise living standards (lifetime consump-
tion smoothing).17 The 2014 Financial Services Inquiry recommended this as a 
system objective, albeit a subsidiary objective. Its primary objective was that 
superannuation should replace or supplement the Age Pension.18 While reducing 
burden on the pension is important, it should not be superannuation’s primary 
role. 
The implication for policy is clear – the rationale for policy reform should be to 
meet the primary objectives of the system. In some instances it would just involve 
minor policy reframing – for example, reframing pension age increases as a 
response to people living longer in retirement rather than as a response to the 
growing budgetary burden. Or reframing the rise of the superannuation guarantee 
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charge to 12 per cent as a mechanism for ensuring people save enough for 
retirement, rather than as a way to reduce their dependence on the public purse.
Helping people fund their own retirement and reducing the burden on the Age 
Pension are not mutually exclusive objectives. In fact, as the superannuation 
system matures and the superannuation guarantee charge rises to 12 per cent, 
we should see a decline or plateau in the proportion of retirees completely reliant 
on the Age Pension, which is desirable. Over the past decade, the proportion 
of Australians aged 60 and over receiving the full Age Pension, has already 
declined.19 
Having a clear consensus around the objectives of the system would be one step 
forward. Policy changes to individual pillars need to reflect the system’s overarch-
ing objectives – not contradict them. Further, confirming and communicating 
transparent, clear and consistent objectives would help Australians plan for retire-
ment without the worry of future inconsistent policy changes.20 
The fourth pillar
Home ownership is an important aspect of Australia’s retirement income system 
– so important that it is often allocated its own (fourth) pillar, to differentiate it from 
the other types of voluntary private savings that occur within the third pillar of 
the system. Home ownership makes a significant impact on people’s wealth at 
retirement, on retirees’ standards of living, and on alleviating the risk of poverty in 
retirement.21 
Australia’s home ownership rates are above 
average: currently about 84 per cent of older 
households are home owners, almost 10 per-
centage points above the OECD average22, 
and more than half of household wealth is 
held in property, especially owner-occupied 
housing.23 High home ownership rates means that the implications of being 
asset-poor are often confined to poverty research and not necessarily discussed 
within the context of retirement income policy.24 Yet, those who retire without a 
home (the asset-poor) find life difficult in retirement and often live in poverty.
In Chapter 4, Judith Yates discusses the extent of the problem. She finds that in 
younger households, owners’ net wealth is around double that of renters. In older 
households, owners’ net wealth is around six times higher than that of renters. 
The average superannuation balance for renters at 65 (around $70,000) is about 
40 per cent of that of homeowners – too low an amount to support a decent 
retirement, bearing in mind the high and escalating costs of rent. 
If the retirement income system’s objective is to deliver dignified retirements with 
decent standards of living, policy reform should allow for the significant contribu-
tion of the family home to that objective. The contribution of housing to decent 
living standards is recognised by not including the family home in the Age Pension 
“ ...in younger households, owners’ net wealth 
is around double that of renters. In older 
households, owners’ net wealth is around 
six times higher than that of renters.”
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assets test, by setting higher Age Pension rates for non-homeowners, and by 
providing rent assistance.25 However, this recognition does not go deep enough 
and each subsequent Intergenerational Report has failed to grasp the importance 
of housing to retirement incomes.26 
While this issue may currently be confined to 
a low percentage of Australian households, 
it is a problem that can only grow. Home 
ownership rates continue to decline among 
younger households aged 25 to 44 years, 
partly due to a fall in housing affordability that 
hits first home buyers the hardest.27 This will have a flow on effect and the number 
of people retiring without the security of their own home will only increase. 
As a short-term measure to improve living standards, the government should 
consider increasing rent assistance to retirees. As a longer-term measure, to 
help address declining home ownership rates among younger households, the 
government should consider allowing first home buyers access to their superan-
nuation to help fund the purchase. 
There are some problems associated with allowing superannuants to access their 
funds to buy houses. When the Federal Treasurer Joe Hockey publicly raised the 
idea in early 2015, it was criticised for being at odds with the superannuation 
objective.28 However, it is not such a bad idea to treat housing and superannua-
tion in the same way for retirement purposes, as discussed in the next section.
Implementation would have to be carefully designed. For example, the Age 
Pension assets test might want to include housing bought (albeit partially) through 
superannuation. Concerns that allowing access to superannuation for house pur-
chases could result in higher demand that further boosts house prices, might be 
offset by addressing affordability through better housing policies. Such housing 
affordability policies could also consider supply-side issues and the current taxa-
tion treatment of housing.29 Another option would be to improve the affordability 
of rental housing. 
The taxation debate
In chapter 2, Professor Stephen King and Dr Rod Maddock discuss the role of 
government in retirement incomes, given the associated market failures. The 
primary market failure is people’s reluctance to save for retirement, which is 
addressed through compulsory superannuation and its role in lifetime consump-
tion smoothing. However, superannuation is just one type of retirement savings 
that people accumulate during their working lives. Retirement savings are a com-
bination of assets, real (e.g. housing) and financial (e.g. superannuation). Even 
though the family home is not necessarily an asset used purely for retirement pur-
poses (unlike superannuation), it still forms a critical component of the retirement 
income system, particularly in Australia. 
“ Home ownership rates continue to decline 
among younger households aged 25 to 44 
years, partly due to a fall in housing affordability 
that hits first home buyers the hardest.”
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At present, government policy treats real and financial assets differently, even 
though both types of assets are used to fund retirement. Most notably, super-
annuants are currently not allowed to withdraw superannuation funds (in 
accumulation phase) to purchase a house.30 Allowing this not only makes sense 
from the perspective of securing retirement assets, but it would also more closely 
align the treatment of superannuation and housing.
The taxation treatment is also different – for example, superannuation contri-
butions are made pre-tax and contributions of up to $30,000 a year attract a 
concessional tax rate of 15 per cent once in a fund.31 While housing does also 
attract some preferential tax treatment32, in most instances, houses can only be 
purchased post-income tax. Figure 3 shows the difference between the marginal 
income tax and the superannuation rates.
Figure 3 
TAX RATES
Source: ATO, DSS
%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Superannuation  
Income
$0
$1
0,
00
0
$1
8,
20
1
$2
5,
00
0
$3
5,
00
0
$4
0,
00
0
$5
0,
00
0
$6
0,
00
0
$7
0,
00
0
$8
0,
00
0
$8
5,
00
0
$9
5,
00
0
$1
05
,0
00
$1
15
,0
00
$1
25
,0
00
$1
35
,0
00
$1
45
,0
00
$1
55
,0
00
$1
65
,0
00
$1
75
,0
00
$1
80
,0
01
$1
90
,0
00
$2
00
,0
00
Figure 4 
SHARE OF CONCESSIONS by INCOmE DECILE
Source: Treasury
%
–10
0
10
20
30
40
Top
decile
Ninth
decile
Eight
decile
Seventh
decile
Sixth
decile
Fifth 
decile
Fourth
decile
Third
decile
Second
decile
First
decile
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
23
The difference between taxation approaches for superannuation and income 
(which is then saved, including for retirement) has sparked equity concerns. 
Taxation incentives mostly benefit the rich, with the top 20 per cent of income 
earners accounting for 58 per cent of superannuation tax concessions (includ-
ing concessions on earnings), as shown in Figure 4.33 There have been calls to 
increase superannuation taxes usually by making them more progressive.34 
Compulsory superannuation contributions already address the market failure of 
people’s reluctance to save. It is therefore unclear why the government should 
provide taxation incentives on voluntary pre-tax superannuation contributions, in 
addition to compulsion. 
The participation rate in voluntary contributions (pre- and post-tax) has been 
declining and is currently at less than 25 per cent.35 People who do not make 
additional contributions cite lack of affordability and the burden of mortgage 
repayments as their primary reasons. Less than 10 per cent attribute their reluc-
tance to insufficient tax incentives.36 A recent literature analysis of the impact of 
taxation incentives on retirement savings concluded that the effect of the super-
annuation tax incentive was not significant.37 Once again, there is little evidence to 
justify taxation incentives. 
As a long-term solution, the superannuation system needs to be redesigned – 
superannuation contributions should be an after-tax payment that effectively 
removes concessional taxation rates, and the family home should be included 
in the Age Pension assets test. Given the importance of housing for retirement, 
another option would be to also allow mortgage payments to be made pre-
income tax.
Making the superannuation guarantee charge an after-tax payment (and includ-
ing owner-occupied housing in the Age Pension assets test) would address the 
disparity between the treatment of superannuation and housing assets, as both 
contribute to retirement. It would also help address equity concerns around the 
differences between income and superannuation tax treatments.
As with all policy suggestions, any proposals need further work including mod-
elling to ensure equitable outcomes (especially for lower-income Australians), 
and to assess the budgetary impacts. There would be some clear issues. For 
example, treating housing in the same way as other types of retirement savings 
would lead to a rise in housing demand and could push up prices, exacerbating 
the affordability issue. This is a fair concern, but one which could be addressed 
through better housing policy as discussed previously. 
Post-tax superannuation contributions would also lead to overall lower balances 
if the contribution rate remains unchanged (assuming everything else stays con-
stant), which would disproportionately affect low-income workers. In the short 
run, the impact on government budgets would be positive through higher taxes 
raised, but with lower superannuation balances. In the long run, the impact would 
probably be negative as more people may end up on the Age Pension. These 
concerns all need to be explored. 
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Since the 1992 introduction of compulsory superannuation, 
almost every subsequent Federal Budget has announced 
changes to the retirement system. Most of the changes 
have added to its complexity. Several of the more recent 
changes may not actually produce their intended effects.
1.  Historical development and 
recent reforms
 Dr Diana Warren
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Introduction
The Australian retirement income system is made up of three elements – a 
publicly-funded, means-tested Age Pension; mandatory employer contributions 
to private superannuation; and voluntary savings, including voluntary superan-
nuation and other long-term saving through property, shares and managed funds. 
This three-pillar system for the provision of retirement income has been endorsed 
by the World Bank as world’s best practice.1 
Over the past two decades, changes to retirement income policy have been 
announced in almost every Federal Budget, with no sign yet that reform is at an 
end. Indeed, the Simpler Super reforms, which came into effect in 2007, have 
been described as the largest overhaul of Australia’s superannuation system 
since the introduction of compulsory superannuation in 1992.2 
This chapter describes the current retirement system in Australia, and provides a 
summary of the historical development of the Australian retirement system, with 
particular emphasis placed on recent reform initiatives designed to increase labour 
force participation of mature age Australians, provide higher levels of savings for 
retirement, and reduce reliance on the Age Pension as the main source of retire-
ment income.3 The expected consequences of recent policy changes are also 
discussed. 
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The Age Pension
The Commonwealth Age Pension came into operation in 1909 and was origi-
nally designed as a social welfare safety net for the elderly, providing a modest 
benefit for those not able to fully support themselves during retirement. Today, 
the Age Pension is Australia’s largest welfare payment, totalling an estimated 
$44 billion in 2015–16.4 The maximum rate of Age Pension is $782 per fortnight 
for single persons and $590 per fortnight for each member of a couple.5 The Age 
Pension is available to men and women aged 65 years and over who are citizens 
of Australia and have been permanent residents for at least 10 years, with eligibil-
ity subject to means testing in the form of an income test and an assets test.6 
Since its introduction, the Age Pension has been a fundamental part of Australia’s 
retirement system. Over the past 100 years, there have been a multitude of 
changes to the rules determining eligibility and payment rates. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the key changes to the Age Pension.
Table 1 
HISTORICAL DEvELOPmENT OF THE AGE PENSION
1909 Commonwealth Age Pension introduced
1910 Eligibility age reduced to 60 for women
1912 Family home exempt from means test
1933 Automatic increases in pension rates on the basis of the cost of living introduced 
1937 Provision for automatic increases in pension rates repealed 
1940 Provision for automatic increases in pension rates reintroduced 
1943 National Welfare Fund established to fund social services 
1952 Means tests on Age Pensions removed for people who were permanently blind
1954 Income from property excluded from the Age Pension means test 
1958 Supplementary assistance (now known as rent assistance) introduced for single pensioners 
1961 Property and income tests for Age Pension eligibility replaced by a merged means test 
1962 Residence qualification for Age Pension eligibility reduced from 20 years to 10 years 
1963 Single pensioners entitled to a higher Age Pension payment 
1969 
Income test taper rate introduced (pension reduced by 50 cents for every dollar over the 
threshold)
1973 Means tests abolished for persons aged over 75
1975   Means tests abolished for persons aged 70 to 74
Pensions linked to 25 per cent of average weekly earnings, to be indexed annually 
1976 Assets test abolished for all persons. Only income test applied
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
28
Table 1 
HISTORICAL DEvELOPmENT OF THE AGE PENSION…CONTINUED
1978 Re-introduction of the assets test for persons over 70
1983 Special income test applied to Age Pension for individuals aged 70 and over 
1985 Age Pension assets test re-introduced for all persons 
1989 Special income test for Age Pensioners 70 years and over removed 
1990 Age Pension means tests liberalised for pensions and annuities 
Income test deeming rules introduced to simplify the income test for financial assets 
1992 Allocated pensions become subject to both the income and assets test 
1993 World Bank endorses Australia’s three-pillar retirement system as world’s best practice 
1995  Phase-in of increase to women’s Age Pension elgibility age commences
1996 Extended deeming applied to financial investments under the Age Pension income test 
1997
Age Pension to be formally maintained at 25 per cent of average male weekly ordinary time 
earnings  
1998 Deferred Pension Bonus Scheme introduced 
Complying annuities 100 per cent exempt from assets test 
2000 Income test taper rate reduced from 50 cents to 40 cents in the dollar
Four per cent GST supplement added to Age Pension
2000 Senior Australian Tax Offset introduced
2004
Assets test exemption applied to complying annuities reduced from 100 per cent to  
50 per cent 
Work test removed for those under the age of 65
2005
Work test for those aged between 65 and 74 simplified to require only that a person had 
worked 40 hours within a 30-day period of the financial year in which contributions were 
paid
2007
Age Pension assets test threshold raised and taper rate reduced from $3 to $1.50 per 
$1000 
Complying annuities no longer exempt from the assets test 
2009 One-off increase in Age Pension rates in response to Harmer Review
Deferred Pension Bonus Scheme replaced by Work Bonus Scheme
Age Pension Supplement replaces GST Supplement, Telephone Allowance, Pharmaceutical 
Allowance and Utilities Allowance. 
Income test taper rate increased from 40 cents to 50 cents in the dollar 
Age Pension eligibility age to be gradually increased to 67 for men and women from 2017
2013 Eligibility age for women reaches 65
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Changes to eligibility age
When the Commonwealth Age Pension came into operation in 1909, it was paid 
to men and women aged 65 and over, subject to a means test and a 25-year 
residency requirement. In 1910, eligibility age for women was reduced to 60 on 
the grounds that women generally became ‘incapacitated for regular work at an 
earlier age than men’.7 These eligibility ages remained in place until July 1995, 
when the qualifying age for women was gradually increased, so that by July 2013 
the eligibility age for women was 65. 
As the population ages, the proportion of people over the age of 65 is expected 
to increase substantially, from 14 per cent in 2012 to 25 per cent by 2101.8 To 
improve the long-term sustainability of Australia’s Age Pension system, it was 
announced in the 2009 Federal budget that, from 2017, the qualifying age for the 
Age Pension for men and women would be progressively increased so that, by 
2023, the eligibility age will be 67. 
The gradual increases in eligibility age are likely to 
have a positive effect on mature age labour force 
participation, particularly among those with low levels 
of superannuation savings or other assets that could 
be used to generate income in retirement.9 However, 
there is concern that older people will use other 
forms of income support as a way of funding their 
retirement until they become eligible for the Age Pension. Therefore, the effect of 
raising the eligibility age will depend strongly on the extent to which people are 
able to access government support payments, in particular the disability support 
pension (DSP), as early retirement options.10 Estimates of the impact of increas-
ing pension eligibility age suggest that this policy change is likely to result in an 
increase in labour force participation and also an increased DSP take-up.11 
In 2014, the National Commission of Audit found that there is a strong case for 
establishing a formal link between eligibility age and increases in life expectancy. 
It was proposed that after the current scheduled increase in eligibility age to 67 
in 2023, the Age Pension age be indexed to average life expectancy, so that by 
2053 the Age Pension age would reach 70 years.12 However, at this point in time, 
no further changes to eligibility age have been scheduled. 
Indexation of the Age Pension
To ensure that pensioners’ standards of living have some reference to the incomes 
of the broader community, Age Pension rates have been linked to wages. In the 
1970s, the Age Pension rate was substantially increased, so that by June 1975 
it was 25 per cent of average male weekly earnings. However, it was not until 
1997 that the Australian Government legislated to maintain the single rate of Age 
Pension at a minimum of 25 per cent of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings. 
“ …there is concern that older people will 
use other forms of income support as a 
way of funding their retirement until they 
become eligible for the Age Pension.”
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In 2008, a Senate inquiry into the adequacy of the Age Pension was presented 
with evidence that the maximum single rate of Age Pension may be insufficient 
to maintain a basic, decent, standard of living. Single pensioners were identified 
as being disproportionately affected by increases in the costs of essentials such 
as food, housing and utilities.13 It was recommended that the government review 
the adequacy of the base level of the Age Pension, particularly the single rate.14 In 
response to these findings, the maximum single base rate of pension was raised 
to two-thirds of the combined partnered rate and the benchmark for the single 
Age Pension increased from 25 per cent to 28 per cent of Male Total Average 
Weekly Earnings. 
As part of the National Commission of Audit in 2014, it was recommended that 
the maximum base rate of the Age Pension be changed over time to be equal to, 
and then grow in line with, 28 per cent of Average Weekly Earnings.15 However, 
this recommendation has not been taken up, and Male Total Average Weekly 
Earnings continues to be the benchmark for indexation of the Age Pension.
Means testing 
Eligibility for the pension has almost always been subject to means testing. In 
1912, the means test was amended so that the family home was not included. 
With the exception of changes in the threshold amounts, no further changes were 
made to means tests until the 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s, several modifica-
tions were made to the income and assets tests, including the introduction of 
a tapered means test in 1969, whereby the pension was reduced by 50 cents, 
rather than one dollar, for every dollar over the income test threshold.
The view of the Age Pension as a legitimate right for those who had contributed 
to the nation through a lifetime of paying taxes, reached its peak when the means 
test was completely abolished for those aged 75 and over in 1973; and for those 
aged 70 and over in 1975.16 Although these changes were reversed in 1978 and 
1983, they reinforced the belief that the Age Pension is a right, rather than a 
safety net benefit, and have contributed to a widespread view that it is legitimate 
for older Australians to arrange their assets and income to permit and maintain 
eligibility for the pension.17 
As part of the Simpler Super reforms introduced in 2007, the cut-out points for 
a partial Age Pension were raised substantially and the taper rate was reduced. 
These changes aimed to make the assets test fairer for those who made addi-
tional savings for their retirement. It is estimated that this change resulted in at 
least 200,000 retirees either receiving an increase in the amount of pension they 
received, or receiving the Age Pension for the first time.18 Figures 1 and 2 show 
that the proportion of men and women receiving a full Age Pension dropped 
slightly; and the proportion receiving a part pension increased considerably by 
2008. The impact of this change was almost reversed by 2010, as a result of the 
increase in the taper rate applied to the Age Pension income test in 2009.
The easing of the assets test appears to be at odds with the government’s stated 
goal of reducing reliance on the Age Pension and encouraging the labour force 
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participation of older workers. In addition to increasing government spending on 
Age Pensions, it may create an incentive to leave the labour force upon reach-
ing Age Pension eligibility age among those who would not have otherwise been 
eligible for an Age Pension. 
At present, pensioners with substantial assets (up to $1.2 million for couples) 
can still receive a part pension. In a change intended to reduce government 
spending on the Age Pension and target support to those who need it most, it 
was announced in the 2015 Federal Budget that the assets test taper rate (the 
amount deducted for every $1000 over the threshold) would increase from $1.50 
to $3 in 2017.23 This doubling of the taper rate is expected to result in a substan-
tial reduction in the proportion of retirees receiving the full Age Pension. 
Figure 1 
PENSION RECEIPT 2002–12, mEN AGED 65 AND OvER (PER CENT)
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015)19 and Department of Social Services (2002 to 2012)20
Note: A small percentage of men aged 65 are observed to be receiving Disability Support Pension, presumably in transition from DSP to 
Age Pension upon reaching age 65. 
Figure 2 
PENSION RECEIPT 2002–12, WOmEN AGED 60 AND OvER (PER CENT)
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015)21 and Department of Social Services (2002 to 2012)22.
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Work bonus schemes and tax offsets
A number of bonus plans and tax offsets have been established with the aim of 
creating financial incentives for older workers to delay retirement. In July 1998, the 
Deferred Pension Bonus Scheme was introduced. This scheme offered a once 
only, tax-free lump sum bonus for those who delayed claiming the Age Pension.24 
It appears that this scheme had very little influence on mature age labour force 
participation. Take-up of the scheme was quite 
low – in 2004, less than 10 per cent of those 
who would have been eligible, participated. 
This was mainly because of the absence of 
publicity for the scheme, the modest level of 
benefit, and the complexity of registering and 
proving eligibility for the period of entitlement.25 
In September 2009, the Deferred Pension Bonus scheme was replaced with 
the Work Bonus Scheme, which operates under the Age Pension income test, 
halving the rate at which the pension is withdrawn for the first $500 of fortnightly 
income.26 The Senior Australian Tax Offset and the Mature Age Workers Tax 
Offset, introduced in 2000 and 2004 respectively, also aim to provide financial 
incentives for older people to continue working beyond the Age Pension eligibil-
ity age, by reducing the amount of tax payable on income for those who have 
reached the Age Pension eligibility age. At present, work bonuses and tax offsets 
appear to have very little influence on retirement decisions, with very few signifi-
cantly deferring their retirement in response to these incentives.27 
Australia’s superannuation system
Although superannuation has existed in Australia since 1862, it was relatively 
uncommon until the 1970s, when it began to be included in industrial awards. By 
1974, 32 per cent of wage and salary earners were covered by superannuation 
– 41 per cent of males, but only 17 per cent of females.28 However, superan-
nuation was still concentrated among a minority of employees – generally higher 
paid white-collar staff in large corporations, employees in the finance sector, 
public servants and members of the Defence Force.29 The first move towards 
compulsory superannuation took place during the 1985 Wages Accord negotia-
tions, when it was agreed that a three per cent wage increase should be paid 
as a superannuation benefit.30 However, it was not until the introduction of the 
Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 that superannuation became a major compo-
nent of Australia’s retirement system. 
The Superannuation Guarantee provided for a major extension of superannuation 
coverage, with employers required to contribute a percentage of an employ-
ee’s earnings to a superannuation fund, which could not be accessed by the 
employee until they reached the superannuation preservation age. The employer 
contribution rate has increased over time, from three per cent in 1992 to nine per 
“ By 1974, 32 per cent of wage and salary 
earners were covered by superannuation – 
41 per cent of males, but only 17 per cent 
of females.”
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cent in 2002. By 1993, 81 per cent of employed Australians were covered by 
superannuation and the gender gap in superannuation coverage had narrowed, 
with 82 per cent of employed men and 78 per cent of employed women covered 
by superannuation.31 Today, almost all workers are entitled to superannuation. 
Among the changes announced in response to the 2010 Henry Tax Review was 
an increase in Superannuation Guarantee contributions from nine per cent to 
12 per cent, to be phased in between 2013 and 2019. Estimates showed that an 
individual who was aged 30 in 2010, with an average wage and an uninterrupted 
work pattern, would have received over $100,000 more in superannuation as a 
result of this change.32 However, in 2014, it was announced that the timeframe for 
these increases would be extended, with the rate remaining at 9.5 per cent until 
2021, then increasing by 0.5 per cent per year so that it will reach 12 per cent by 
2025. 
Since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, changes to either the 
taxation of superannuation or the rules regarding voluntary superannuation contri-
butions have been announced in almost every Federal Budget. Table 2 provides a 
summary of the development of Australia’s superannuation system. 
1922 Commonwealth employees superannuation fund established
1973 National Superannuation Committee of Inquiry Established
1983 Five per cent tax on lump sum superannuation benefits introduced 
Increased tax deductibility for superannuation contributions made by employees and the self 
employed
1984 Tax concessions for annuities introduced 
1985 Accord Mark II includes a three per cent employer superannuation contribution
1986 Three per cent award superannuation endorsed by Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
1987 Regulatory framework for superannuation introduced
1988
Major reforms of superannuation taxation – introduction of 15 per cent tax on 
superannuation income, reduction of lump sum taxes, 15 per cent annuity rebate introduced, 
introduction of marginal Reasonable Benefit Limit (RBL) scales 
1990 Introduction of tax rebates for superannuation contributions by low coverage employees
1992 Superannuation Guarantee commences
1993 Superannuation Industry Supervision (SIS) Act passed
1994  
Flat rate RBLs replace marginal RBLs. Age-determined employer contribution limits 
introduced. Increased eligibility for 15 per cent annuity rebate. 
Commencement of phase-in of increase of superannuation preservation age to 60
1997
Superannuation Surcharge of 15 per cent applied to voluntary superannuation contributions 
of those whose annual income was $85,000 or more
Table 2 
HISTORICAL DEvELOPmENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION SySTEm
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Table 2 
HISTORICAL DEvELOPmENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION SySTEm…CONT
1997
Legislation passed to maintain single Age Pension at 25 per cent Male Total Average Weekly 
Earnings
Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) established as an alternative to superannuation
Maximum age for superannuation guarantee contributions increased from 65 to 70
Eighteen per cent rebate introduced for contributions made on behalf of a low income 
spouse 
1999
Announcement that Superannuation preservation age to be gradually increased from 55 to 
60 by 2024 
2000
Fifteen per cent tax rebate for voluntary superannuation contributions abolished under the 
new tax system
2002 Legislation passed to allow superannuation splitting in divorce cases
Maximum age for superannuation contributions increased from 70 to 75 for persons 
working at least 10 hours per week
2003
Introduction of government co-contribution for low/middle income earners (100 per cent up 
to $1000)
Superannuation surcharge reduced from 15 per cent to 12.5 per cent
2004  
Superannuation co-contribution extended to individuals earning up to $58,000 (150 per cent 
up to $1500) 
Superannuation surcharge reduced from 12.5 per cent to 10 per cent
Work test for superannuation contributions made by those under the age of 65 abolished
Mature Age Worker Tax Offset (MAWTO) introduced 
2005 Superannuation Surcharge abolished 
Transition-to-Retirement Pensions available
Choice of funds legislation introduced
2007 Exemption from tax on superannuation end benefits for Australians aged 60 and over  
Co-contribution doubled for those who made eligible contributions in 2005-06
Reasonable Benefit Limits abolished 
2008
Announcement of gradual increase in compulsory employer superannuation contributions 
from nine per cent to 12 per cent starting from July 2013 
2008 Maximum age limit for superannuation guarantee contributions to be raised to 74 in 2013
Maximum superannuation co-contribution reduced to $1000 (150 per cent up to $1000)
2009 Co-contribution matching rate reduced to 100 per cent (100 per cent up to $1000)
2012 Co-contribution matching rate reduced to 50 per cent (50 per cent up to $500)
2014 Further increases in compulsory employer superannuation contributions delayed until 2021
From 1 January 2014, employers must only pay default superannuation contributions to an 
authorised ‘MySuper’ product
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Changes to preservation age
In the 1997–98 Budget, it was announced that from 1 July 2016 the preservation 
age for people born after 1 July 1960 would be gradually increased from 55 to 60 
years, so that for those born after 30 June 1964, the superannuation preservation 
age will be 60.33 Although these changes are yet to take effect, one would expect 
that the increase in superannuation preservation age would provide an incentive 
for those with reasonable amounts of superannuation to remain in the workforce 
at least until they are able to access their superannuation. It may also delay the 
start of a gradual transition to retirement for those who intend to reduce their 
working hours and supplement their reduced labour income with superannuation 
income before retiring from the workforce completely.
Changes to the taxation of superannuation
With the multitude of policy changes that had been put in place since the intro-
duction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992, the superannuation system 
had become extremely complex, particularly in terms of the taxation of super-
annuation contributions and end benefits. There were different arrangements for 
tax on superannuation contributions, earnings and benefits – a lump sum could 
include up to eight different parts taxed in seven different ways. This made it 
extremely difficult for people contemplating retirement to understand how their 
superannuation benefits would be taxed, and also affected younger people con-
sidering whether or not to make additional superannuation contributions. 34 
In May 2006, the Australian Government released a proposal called A Plan to 
Simplify and Streamline Superannuation. The aim of these reforms was ‘to assist 
and encourage people to achieve a higher standard of living in retirement than 
would be possible from the Age Pension 
alone, provide significant benefits over 
time to Australians with only compul-
sory superannuation, reward people 
for making additional superannuation 
contributions to improve their retirement 
income, and boost incentives to work 
and save’.35 Under this plan, Australia’s 
superannuation system has undergone 
substantial change. In July 2007, the Reasonable Benefit Limit tax-free thresholds 
were abolished; and lump sum superannuation benefits paid to individuals aged 
60 or over became tax-free.36 
The removal of taxes on superannuation benefits taken after the age of 60 may 
encourage some people to remain in the workforce until age 60 in order to maxi-
mise their superannuation income. On the other hand, it may also encourage 
older workers; particularly those aged 60 and over who have substantial super-
annuation savings, to either reduce their working hours or retire early. There is 
also the simpler theory that people build up a target stock of wealth in order to 
generate their desired retirement income, and retire once they reach their savings 
goal. Then, the windfall income generated from the abolition of tax on superan-
nuation payouts will lead some individuals to reach their target wealth stock at 
“ …different arrangements for tax on 
superannuation contributions, earnings and 
benefits…made it extremely difficult for people 
contemplating retirement to understand how their 
superannuation benefits would be taxed.”
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an earlier age, enabling them to retire earlier.37 At present, the abolition of taxes 
on superannuation payouts for those aged 60 and over will only affect a minority 
of prospective retirees, as relatively few have superannuation balances in excess 
of the Reasonable Benefit Limits that previously applied.38 However, as the 
Superannuation Guarantee matures, the proportion of retirees benefiting from the 
abolition of this tax will increase. Still, the average superannuation balance will not 
have reached the Reasonable Benefit Limit threshold for another 25 to 30 years.39 
Transition to Retirement Pensions
To encourage older workers to remain in the workforce, a new category of benefit 
called a Transition to Retirement Pension was introduced in July 2005. These 
pensions allow individuals who have reached superannuation preservation age 
to access their superannuation as a non-commutable income stream, allowing 
those who want to remain in the workforce, but reduce their working hours, to 
supplement their income with superannuation. 
Prior to the introduction of these pensions, 
people under the age of 65 had to leave 
employment before they were able to access 
any superannuation benefits. 
The introduction of Transition to Retirement 
Pensions is likely to have encouraged some 
people to remain in the labour force and 
reduce their working hours, rather than retir-
ing completely. However, it is possible that some of those who continue working 
and use their superannuation to supplement their labour income will reduce their 
superannuation assets substantially before they actually retire, increasing the 
likelihood that they will be eligible for a full or part Age Pension. It is also unclear 
whether take up of this option will result in an overall increase in workforce par-
ticipation among older workers. While this policy aims to encourage workforce 
participation among those who are able to retire, it may also tempt older workers 
to reduce their working hours at an earlier age than they might otherwise have 
done without access to these pensions, resulting in an overall reduction in labour 
force participation among older workers.40 
The third pillar – voluntary savings 
Australians’ asset portfolios are dominated by housing; the second largest asset 
of most households is superannuation; and other financial assets such as shares, 
managed funds and cash in bank accounts make up a much smaller proportion 
of household wealth.41 To encourage older Australians to make additional savings 
for their retirement, incentives such as the superannuation co-contribution 
scheme and the liberalisation of work tests for voluntary superannuation contribu-
tions have been introduced. 
“ …this policy…may also tempt older workers 
to reduce their working hours at an earlier 
age than they might otherwise have done…
resulting in an overall reduction in labour 
force participation among older workers.” 
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
37
Voluntary superannuation contributions 
When the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced, voluntary superannuation 
contributions could only be made by people aged 65 or younger. To encourage 
older workers to remain in the labour force and contribute to superannuation, the 
age limit on voluntary superannuation contributions was increased in 1997, so 
that people aged 70 or younger could contribute, on the condition that they were 
still in the workforce. In 2002, the maximum age for voluntary contributions was 
increased to age 75 for those who were working at least 10 hours per week; and 
in 2004, work tests were removed for those under age 65.42 
The Superannuation Co-contribution Scheme
In the 2002–03 Budget, the introduction of the Superannuation Co-contribution 
Scheme was announced. To encourage people to make greater contributions to 
superannuation, and thereby increase their retirement incomes, the government 
would make a matching co-contribution of up to $1000 per year for those earning 
up to $32,500 who made personal undeducted superannuation contributions. 
Eligibility for the co-contribution scheme was extended to those with incomes of 
up to $40,000 in 2003, and $58,000 in 2004. From July 2004, the maximum 
annual co-contribution available was increased to $1500, and the matching 
rate increased to $1.50 for every dollar contributed. In his 2007 Budget speech, 
Treasurer Peter Costello announced that, in recognition of the effort people 
had already made to save for their retirement, the government would double 
the superannuation co-contribution paid for eligible contributions made in the 
2005–06 financial year. Since that time, matching rates and the upper threshold 
for eligibility have been reduced. At present, those with incomes below $46,920 
can receive a co-contribution of 50 cents for every dollar contributed, up to a 
maximum of $500. 
There is some evidence that the superannuation co-contribution scheme 
has delivered benefits to some low-income employees, particularly women. 
Among those who participated in the co-contribution scheme in the 
2003–04 financial year, around 55 per cent of beneficiaries had total individ-
ual incomes of less than $30,000 per year, 
39 per cent were single, 63 per cent were female 
and 47 per cent were Baby Boomers – the group 
with the lowest level of superannuation savings 
relative to their expected retirement needs.43 
However, participation in the scheme has been 
low, so far, relative to the eligible population. This 
suggests either ignorance of the scheme, or a lack 
of discretionary income available to make addi-
tional superannuation contributions.44 
“ …the superannuation co-contribution 
scheme has delivered benefits to some 
low-income employees, particularly 
women…in the 2003–04 financial year, 
around 55 per cent of beneficiaries had 
total individual incomes of less than 
$30,000 per year, 39 per cent were single, 
63 per cent were female…”
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Concluding remarks
Since the introduction of compulsory superannuation, the Australian Retirement 
System has undergone a spate of changes, which, for the most part, have added 
to its complexity. Another major shortcoming of Australia’s current retirement 
income system is the different ages at which various policies take effect – the 
superannuation preservation age is currently at 55; tax concessions on super-
annuation apply at age 60; and Age Pension eligibility age is currently 65. This 
variation makes it possible for individuals to draw down their superannuation prior 
to Age Pension age, creating an incentive for early retirement. With no incentive 
to take superannuation payouts as an income stream rather than a lump sum, 
an average superannuation payout may provide a means of funding early retire-
ment before reaching Age Pension eligibility age. This effect is augmented by the 
very slow phasing in of the higher superannuation preservation age, and is exac-
erbated by the possibility of ‘double dipping’ – where 
people dissipate part of their superannuation wealth 
prior to pension eligibility so that, in effect, the social 
security system subsidises their early retirement. 
At this point, the total effect of recent changes to retire-
ment policy on mature age labour force participation is 
unclear. However, based on the available evidence, it 
appears that several of the more recent policy changes 
may not actually have their intended effects. Take-up of 
schemes such as the Deferred Pension Bonus Scheme and the superannuation 
co-contribution scheme has been quite low; the removal of tax on superannuation 
benefits taken after the age of 60 will not affect the majority of those who will retire 
in the near future; and it is unclear whether Transition to Retirement Pensions will 
increase overall labour force participation of the mature age population. 
The one policy change where effects can be seen immediately is the liberalisation 
of the Age Pension assets test threshold, which has increased the number of 
people eligible to receive a full or part Age Pension – a result that is contradictory 
to the government’s stated goal of containing the costs of the Age Pension. It is 
expected that the recently announced tightening of the assets test will have the 
opposite effect, reducing the number of people eligible to receive full or part Age 
Pensions and possibly creating an incentive to delay retirement.45
The constant flux in government regulation and policies may, in itself, make it 
difficult for those planning their retirement in the short-to-medium term to make 
informed decisions about their retirement arrangements. Uncertainty about how 
long any particular retirement policy will be in place, or in its current form, may 
prevent people from responding to policy incentives that might otherwise have 
persuaded them to change their retirement plans. 
Further simplifying the existing system, particularly the rules regarding pension 
eligibility and the tax treatment of superannuation, or at least providing some sta-
bility in the current rules, may give older Australians more confidence in planning 
their transition to retirement. 
 “ The constant flux in government 
regulation and policies may, in 
itself, make it difficult for those 
planning their retirement in the 
short-to-medium term…”
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Twenty years after its introduction, Australia’s compulsory 
superannuation system is still maturing. But its objectives 
are blurry and the policy debate is stuck on the 
budgetary implications of our ageing population.
2.  Fixing the superannuation  
policy mess 
 Professor Stephen King  
 Dr Rodney Maddock
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Introduction
Australia’s superannuation system is a curious hybrid. It starts from the premise 
that people do not accumulate enough savings during their working lives and so 
should be forced to save. It then turns around and gives the same people signifi-
cant freedom about how quickly they can spend their savings once they reach a 
prescribed age. Clearly the ‘young’ cannot be trusted until they are (about) 65, 
but then…they are completely trustworthy after that.
Of course, we exaggerate. However, the different rules and procedures in the 
Australian superannuation system do not appear to have a coherent intellectual 
basis. This lack of a consistent framework means that Australia’s policies about 
the financing of retirement are a confused mess.
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In this chapter, we highlight five market failures and behavioural biases under-
lying the retirement savings system in Australia, and explore some of the 
consequences of a market failure approach:
•	 Myopia: failure to save sufficiently for the future
•	 Agency: failure to supervise the managers of one’s assets
•	 Taxation: the need to tax somebody to support those who cannot save enough
•	 Free riding: spending a lump sum and then reverting to public support
•	 Risk aversion: excessive caution about longevity
Myopia: what is superannuation for?
The Australian superannuation system does not have a clear objective. This 
problem was noted by the final report of the 2014 Financial System Inquiry which 
made its views very clear: 
“ Government should seek broad agreement on the following primary objective for the superan-
nuation system: To provide income in retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension.”1 
The inquiry then undermined this clarity with a list of subsidiary objectives, 
including:
•	 Facilitate consumption smoothing over the course of an individual’s life;
•	 Help people manage financial risks in retirement;
•	 Alleviate fiscal pressures on Government from the retirement income system.
In our view, the Financial System Inquiry has ‘put the cart before the horse’. The 
primary objectives of the superannuation system should be to:
•	 Help people manage financial risks in retirement; and 
•	 Facilitate consumption smoothing over the course of an individual’s life. 
The Age Pension and other benefits paid by federal and state governments to 
the elderly are part of Australia’s broader welfare safety net. These payments will 
interact to some degree with the incentives facing individuals to save during their 
working lives and how they spend their savings in retirement. Further, it is clear 
that the Age Pension will also help people to manage financial risk in retirement, 
particularly those individuals who are unable to save enough during their working 
lives to fund their non-working years. 
However, the fundamental social challenge for Australia’s superannuation scheme 
is how to ensure that each individual, during his or her working life, saves enough 
to fund the years of expenditure after he or she has ceased paid work. This has 
nothing in particular to do with how the government funds its budget, including 
how the government funds the Age Pension. It is simply an issue of each of us 
smoothing our consumption over a lifetime.
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It might be argued that the Age Pension and the superannuation system will inter-
act, so that the two schemes must be considered together. To some degree, 
this is trivially true. The same link can be made between all welfare schemes that 
include some means testing on the basis of income or wealth. 
But it is easy to overstate the links between the superannuation system and the 
Age Pension. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) found that, for people 
thinking about retirement, financial security was by far 
the most important factor (women 36 per cent, men 39 
per cent), followed by personal health (23 per cent for 
each), while just 11 per cent of women and 13 per cent 
of men rated the most important determinant as becom-
ing eligible for pensions or benefits.2
From the perspective of lifetime consumption smoothing, 
‘an asset is an asset’. In order to have money to spend 
after finishing paid work, individuals build up assets while 
they are working. There are a wide range of potential 
assets, including financial assets, housing and other real assets, and durable 
goods. Ideally an individual will have a suite of diversified assets to reduce risk.3
This pool of assets can generate income needed to meet expenditures, or reduce 
the need to pay rent or purchase services.
Once superannuation is viewed from the perspective of asset accumulation to 
smooth lifetime income, some existing asset treatments can be seen as, at best, 
incongruous. For example, in March 2015, the Federal Treasurer Joe Hockey 
canvassed the idea of using superannuation savings to buy housing assets and 
was roundly criticised. However, such a reallocation of assets can be perfectly 
sensible.4 In principle we are merely talking about a transfer from one sort of asset 
into another, both of which will be needed to support the retirement phase of 
the individual’s life. Chapter 4 in this volume looks directly at the importance of 
housing in supporting quality of life in later years.
If we accept that compulsory superannuation is designed to overcome ‘myopia’ 
and a reluctance to save, and that saving involves the accumulation of assets, 
then the sharp distinctions that policy draws between financial assets and real 
assets, are inappropriate. Superannuation funds should be able to be invested in 
buying houses, and homes should be included in any means tests. This is con-
sistent with the view of the Australia’s Future Tax System (Henry) Review, which 
proposed that, “Superannuation balances should be included in Age Pension 
means tests on the same basis as other saving”.5 
“ If we accept that saving involves 
the accumulation of assets, then...
Superannuation funds should 
be able to be invested in buying 
houses, and homes should be 
included in any means tests.”
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Agency: How is superannuation managed?
Superannuants fall into two groups: those who actively manage their own funds 
(called ‘self-managed super funds’), and those who use an agent. 
By far the most rapidly growing segment of the superannuation industry has been 
the self-managed sector.6 Individuals with self-managed super funds are older 
than average and have a larger-than-average pool of savings. These two factors 
may be related. Individuals accumulate superannuation assets with age, and their 
interest in the effective management of those assets is likely to increase with the 
size of those assets. The asset allocation of self-managed super funds is gener-
ally quite different to the funds of people with professional managers.7 Of course, 
individual investors are not professional managers. In that sense, the growth of 
self-managed super funds may reflect the lack of satisfaction with the fees and 
performance of professional funds managers. 
Most people, however, rely on agents to manage their superannuation savings, 
trusting fund managers to manage their savings appropriately and with very little 
supervision. Trustees have responsibilities for ensuring appropriate processes are 
followed and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has regulatory 
oversight.
There are two broad categories of managed superannuation funds: not-for-profit 
industry funds, and commercial funds. The not-for-profit funds argue that they 
charge lower fees to the benefit of savers. The commercial funds assert that they 
are more professional because they have a majority of independent trustees.
It is difficult for individuals to monitor the performance of their agents. It is also 
unclear which funds provide higher long-term returns.8 Further, even if one fund 
does outperform others on a short-term basis, this is 
likely to be the result of random chance rather than any 
intrinsic skill. As the advertising caveat notes, ‘past per-
formance is not an indicator of future return’. 
This difficulty in monitoring superannuation managers is 
exacerbated by myopia and free-riding. The same myopia 
that leads people to save too little for the future also supports a lack of concern 
about savings that you might only be able to access in 40 years’ time. Further, 
individual investors have only a small stake in any fund. It pays any individual 
investor to free-ride on the monitoring effort of other investors. The result is that, 
in practice, people do not pay much attention to how their funds are managed.
This has led a number of critics to assert that the funds do not do a particularly 
good job.9,10 There have been a range of recommendations as to how to modify 
the system to reduce the costs to superannuants. 
“ …in practice, people do not pay 
much attention to how their funds 
are managed.”
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Following the Cooper Review, a number of changes were made to lower the cost 
of default funds and to improve administrative efficiency. While some commenta-
tors have criticised these reforms as inadequate11, the Financial System Inquiry 
has argued that we need to wait to see how effective the Cooper changes are 
before we move to further change the system.12 
In summary, savers are not engaged with how their superannuation is managed. 
This is not unreasonable given the long time-horizons, the difficulty of determining 
good performance, and the administrative complexity of the system. With clients 
disengaged, there has been little competitive pressure on administrators and 
trustees to perform better. Hopefully the administrative changes made following 
the Cooper Review will be effective. If not, we will need to resort to alternative 
administrative structures.13 
Taxation: How does the government fund its support for 
savings? 
The current superannuation system has a number of taxation incentives built-
in. Income used to make contributions pays a reduced tax rate, earnings inside 
funds have taxation incentives, and payouts can be completely untaxed. Any 
bequests however can be taxed so that the superannuation system is the one 
area in Australia subject to death duties.
Providing lower tax rates on superannuation savings than on other forms of 
savings lowers the government’s potential tax revenue. This means that more 
government revenue has to be raised from other sources. Since taxation causes 
people’s behaviour to change, the low tax rates on superannuation lead to more 
savings than otherwise, and the need to raise revenue elsewhere means that 
fewer of the more highly-taxed other activities will take place. 
The favourable tax treatment of superannuation savings has led to calls for 
‘reform’ to raise the tax rates on superannuation. It is argued that this will reduce 
the costs of superannuation to the government.14  
However, the Henry Review of the Australian taxation 
system argued that taxes on superannuation should be 
reduced, that is, the implied taxation ‘subsidy’ to super-
annuation increased. “Australia’s personal income tax 
system should continue to represent a hybrid personal 
income tax, with the main forms of lifetime savings for 
most Australians – superannuation and owner-occupied 
housing – taxed at a lower rate or exempt from income tax, but with other savings 
taxed more consistently to achieve a more productive and better allocation of 
savings”. This recommendation runs counter to much of the current debate.
“ Any bequests can be taxed so that 
the superannuation system is the 
one area in Australia subject to 
death duties.”
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The review argued for the principle that: “Savings invested in owner-occupied 
housing or superannuation would either be tax-exempt or close to exempt 
in practice, both being important determinants of people’s living standards in 
retirement.”15
The logic behind this type of proposal is quite straightforward and, in our opinion, 
compelling. Taxing income that is then saved discriminates against a person who 
chooses to save rather than consume. 
To understand this, consider the total taxes paid by two 
people who have the same income profile over their working 
lives, but one consumes it all while the other saves half. If we 
have a tax on savings, the second person pays a lot more tax 
over his or her lifetime than the spendthrift who consumed 
everything and saved nothing. This is clearly not fair with 
the ‘saver’ paying a higher level of total tax (in present value 
terms) than the ‘consumer’. 
The principle that income from savings should be taxed lightly, if at all, thus 
reflects arguments about horizontal equity. The current debate about lower tax 
rates ‘subsidies’ for superannuants focuses instead on two other issues: on 
equity between people with different income levels, and on the government’s 
search for additional revenue sources to address its deficit. The Henry review was 
quite clear about the best places for governments to pursue extra taxation, and 
superannuation was not one of them – the Henry review recommended reducing 
the overall tax take on superannuation.
It is sometimes argued that income earned on savings should be taxed because 
of vertical equity. People with higher incomes save more, and hence get a greater 
benefit from reduced taxes on savings than do people on lower incomes, and it is 
argued that this is unfair.
In our opinion, however, this argument is simply confused. If higher income 
earners should be taxed more, then this should be reflected in progressive income 
tax rates, and not through a distortionary tax on income that is then saved.16 
While it can be argued that reduced taxation on any form of savings might be 
both equitable and efficient, this is not the same as the argument put forward 
by the Henry review. The Henry review considered that there should be reduced 
rates of taxation on savings that occur through the compulsory superannuation 
savings system. However, it is not obvious that compulsory superannuation 
savings should be treated more favourably than other forms of saving. Clearly 
there is no issue of horizontal equity. With compulsion, two people with the same 
lifetime income stream and savings invested the same way will finish up at retire-
ment with the same pool of superannuation savings. There is thus no issue of 
inequity between these two people. 
Further, while there is a solid economic argument to reduce or exempt tax on all 
savings, given that non-superannuation savings are taxed, there seems little merit 
in reducing taxes on compulsory savings alone. Such a reduction in taxation will 
not change behaviour because the individuals have no choice. This leads us to 
“ Taxing income that is then 
saved discriminates against a 
person who chooses to save 
rather than consume.”
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the conclusion that with compulsory contributions there is no particular reason 
to provide taxation incentives on superannuation at all. Compulsory contributions 
to superannuation should be paid out of people’s after-tax income. This creates 
no issue of horizontal or vertical equity. To maintain parity with investment in the 
family home, the funds need not be taxed again, but both the family home and 
superannuation assets should be included in any means test.
In summary, there is a broad argument that the way that savings in general are 
taxed should be reconsidered. However, given the current taxation system and 
the compulsory nature of superannuation, there is no relevant argument for 
superannuation to be treated more favourably than other forms of saving.
Free riding: spending a lump sum and then reverting to public 
support
When we switch focus from the accumulation phase to the retirement phase, dif-
ferent issues arise. One issue that attracts considerable attention is the idea that 
people have an incentive to spend their accumulated financial savings quickly and 
then revert to the public pension – the concern with ‘double dipping’. Here again 
the worry is about horizontal equity. Two 
people with the same accumulated finan-
cial assets on retirement will get different 
treatment to the extent that one spends his 
or her savings quickly and the other slowly.
From a policy point of view we might also 
be concerned about what the lump sum (or 
rapid run down of funds) is spent on. Blowing one’s pot of accumulated savings 
on a holiday is quite different from using it to pay off a mortgage on the home. 
The latter involves transforming one long-lived asset into another, and since one 
needs both income and housing in retirement, it is not clear we should be con-
cerned if lump sums are diverted between forms of saving (particularly for housing 
or health).
It is not clear how important double dipping really is. As noted above, the 
dominant factor shaping retirement decisions is the need for financial security. 
The data is sketchy but Colonial First State estimates that only 16.7 per cent of 
accumulated funds are withdrawn as lump sums, although this involves about 60 
per cent of the total number of accounts. Withdrawals are mainly concentrated 
on small pools of savings so that, overall, some 85 per cent of accounts under 
$50,000 feature a lump sum withdrawal.
The large number of small accounts involved may give rise to concern, but infor-
mation about the use of the funds suggests that the vast majority of the lump 
sums are used to reduce debt or convert the funds to some other form of savings. 
“ Blowing one’s pot of accumulated savings on a 
holiday is quite different from using it to pay off 
a mortgage on the home.”
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Use %
Paid off home/paid for home improvements/bought new home 29
Invested the money elsewhere/personal savings/bank 20
Rolled over or invested in approved deposit, deferred annuity or other superannuation 15
Cleared outstanding debts 12
Bought or paid off car/vehicle 11
Paid for a holiday 8
Assisted family 3
Purchased an immediate annuity 1
Source: Colonial First State Rice Warner Income streams index. “Do not know” has been eliminated.
So, should we worry about people taking lump sums and double dipping? Not 
very much is the answer. Only about one-sixth of the pool of savings is taken 
out as lump sums, and only one-twelfth of that is used directly for consumption. 
Despite the publicity it has attracted, double dipping is quantitatively a very small 
issue.
Two solutions are suggested to the lump sum ‘problem’. The self-managed 
superannuants have suggested that retirement income taken as a lump sum 
should be subject to a special tax.17 The table above demonstrates that most 
lump sums are used to reduce debt, build assets or save in some other way, so 
a new tax would introduce additional distortions. The second suggestion is to 
eliminate the right to withdraw lump sums entirely. This is similarly adding new 
distortions into the system.
Even more extreme is the suggestion that superannuation amounts should be 
forcibly annuitised. This would remove any discretion on the part of savers as 
to how they used their savings. Under such a proposal, the 
superannuation system would force people to put aside 
some 10 per cent of their income over their working lives, 
and then pay them a pension at a set rate from their savings 
over the rest of their lives. If this is the case it is hard to see 
why we need a private superannuation system at all. The 
government could just raise income tax by 10 per cent, put 
the money in the Future Fund, and then use the money to 
pay everybody a pension based on the Fund’s earnings.
If the withdrawal of lump sums from superannuation is viewed as a problem then 
the simplest solution is to set a maximum percentage of one’s superannuation 
savings which can be withdrawn in any year, perhaps 10 per cent.
“ So, should we worry about 
people taking lump sums and 
double dipping? Not very much is 
the answer.”
Table 1 
USES OF LUmP SUmS
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Risk aversion: managing longevity risk
Given the uncertainty about how long one will live, it is hard to decide how quickly 
to run down one’s savings after retirement. Since people have a strong aversion 
to running out of funds before they die, there is a clear incentive to under-con-
sume in old age, even potentially to continue saving.18 
This has even led to recent discussion of the ‘problem’ of superannuation savings 
being passed between generations adding to wealth inequality (see the Australian 
Financial Review, 29 May 2015). It is ironic that there is public concern about 
people running down their superannuation too quickly at the same time as there 
is a concern about people running it down too slowly. Since we abolished death 
duties in Australia several decades ago, and since superannuation is subject to a 
‘death duty’, this can hardly be a serious concern. If we worry about intergenera-
tional wealth transfers, the solution is a general system of death duties – it is not a 
superannuation issue.
Of course, there is also a policy in place to address the issue. Superannuants in 
pension-mode are forced to take a minimum amount from their superannuation 
each year. And this amount rises with age. 
If people save from their superannuation 
pensions, the amount is forced out of the 
superannuation umbrella and into other forms 
of savings subject to normal taxation rules.
Instead of saving excessively in retirement 
to manage longevity risk, financial products 
like deferred annuities can help manage the 
risk. These are pooled investments which only pay off to the survivors once they 
reach a certain age. We are just starting to see the emergence of these products. 
Just as life insurance products protect one’s family against one dying too young, 
deferred annuities can protect against dying too old (i.e. running out of money too 
early). The market for such deferred annuities seems certain to grow quickly.
“ It is ironic that there is public concern about 
people running down their superannuation too 
quickly at the same time as there is a concern 
about people running it down too slowly.”
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Conclusions
People are disinclined or unable to save enough while they are working to accu-
mulate the assets they need to ensure an adequate living standard after they 
retire. We have three basic policy vehicles to address this failure: compulsory 
superannuation that forces people to save more; capital gains exemptions on 
principal residences that allow people to accumulate real assets; and the age 
pension that provides a financial safety net. 
Compulsory superannuation should be seen as a way 
to help people fund their retirement – not as a way to 
save the government money. If retirees have adequate 
resources, they will not need to access the safety net, 
thereby saving other tax payers from supporting them 
in old age.
Allowing superannuation to be accumulated on a pre-tax basis creates other 
problems. First, it treats real and financial assets very differently when both are 
crucial to supporting retirement. Second, it creates significant equity concerns 
between people at different tax brackets. The long term solution is either to make 
superannuation an after-tax payment, or to allow mortgage payments to be made 
from pre-tax income.
There is little evidence that allowing people to access lump sums is a significant 
problem. Prohibiting the withdrawal of lump sums, or taxing them, are extreme 
solutions. If any policy is needed, imposing a maximum rate of withdrawal may be 
easier and more consistent with the current structures.
Indeed, people seem more inclined to run down their superannuation too slowly 
rather than too quickly. The emergence of deferred annuities provides a market 
solution based on insurance principles and seems likely to allow people to 
manage their longevity risk in a satisfactory manner. 
“ Compulsory superannuation should be 
seen as a way to help people fund their 
retirement – not as a way to save the 
government money.”
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When internationally benchmarked, measured against 
more than 40 indicators, Australia’s retirement system 
proves one of the world’s best. But there is always 
room for improvement.
3.  Australia’s retirement system. 
How does it stack up?  
How can we improve it? 
 Dr David Knox
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Introduction
Retirement income systems around the world are now under more pressure 
than ever before. Whether the system is predominantly a social security system 
(as is common in Europe); a private sector pension system for workers (as has 
developed in some Anglo-Saxon countries); or a combination, every system is 
facing similar challenges. These include the economic effects of ageing popula-
tions (caused by lower fertility rates and increasing life expectancies), uncertain 
economic conditions (including historically low interest rates) and significant gov-
ernment debt in many countries. 
Many governments are therefore recognising that their current arrangements are 
not sustainable. Hence, pension reform is happening around the world. These 
reforms include increasing retirement or pension eligibility ages; a greater focus 
on funding future benefits through increased contributions; improving the cover-
age of the private pension system; reducing the level of indexation for pensions; 
encouraging labour force participation at older ages; and a greater focus on gov-
ernance, fees and regulation.
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Before joining Mercer in 2005, David was at PricewaterhouseCoopers and prior to that was 
the Foundation Professor of Actuarial Studies at the University of Melbourne. 
He has acted as a consultant to a range of financial organisations, in both the private and 
public sectors, specialising in superannuation and retirement incomes. He has spoken and 
written widely on this topic and served on many government and industry committees.
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Of course, each pension system has evolved from that country’s particular eco-
nomic, social, political and historical circumstances. That means there is no single 
system that can be transplanted from one country and applied, without change, 
to another country. There are still certain features and characteristics that, across 
the range of systems, are likely to lead to improved financial benefits for retirees, 
an increased likelihood of future system sustainability, and a greater level of com-
munity confidence and trust.
With these desirable outcomes in mind, the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension 
Index (MMGPI) was initially published in 2009 and is now published each October 
comparing the pension systems in 25 countries. But, before we consider the 
findings of the MMGPI, it is helpful to recognise the variety of possible pension 
systems.
The multi-pillar approach
The structure and characteristics of pension systems around the world exhibit 
great diversity with a wide range of features and norms. Comparisons are not 
straightforward.
In its influential 1994 report Averting the Old Age Crisis, the World Bank rec-
ommended a multi-pillar system for the provision of old-age income security, 
comprising:
Pillar 1:  Mandatory, publicly-managed, tax-financed public pension
Pillar 2: Mandatory, privately-managed, fully-funded benefits
Pillar 3:  Voluntary, privately-managed, fully-funded personal savings
Subsequently, Holzmann and Hinz (2005) of the World Bank extended this three-
pillar system to the following five-pillar approach:
Pillar 0:  A basic pension from public finances that may be universal or 
means-tested.
Pillar 1:  A mandated public pension plan that is publicly-managed with contribu-
tions and, in some cases, financial reserves.
Pillar 2:  Mandated and fully-funded occupational or personal pension plans with 
financial assets.
Pillar 3:  Voluntary and fully-funded occupational or personal pension plans with 
financial assets.
Pillar 4:  A voluntary system outside the pension system with access to a range of 
financial and non-financial assets and support.
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This multi-pillar approach has significant benefits as it diversifies the risks across 
social security (pillars 0 and 1) and private sector provision (pillars 2 and 3), while 
recognising that financial and non-financial support for the elderly can and does 
occur outside the pension systems.
Within the Australian system, pillar 0 represents our means tested age pension, 
whereas pillars 2 and 3 represent the compulsory Superannuation Guarantee 
(SG) system for employees and voluntary contributions made by employees and 
the self-employed respectively. Unlike many developed economies, Australia 
does not have a pillar 1 arrangement where contributions are made by employers 
and/or employees into a public pension (or social security) arrangement. It is also 
important to recognise the importance of pillar 4, which includes non-superannu-
ation savings, home ownership, as well as government support to the elderly in a 
range of areas including health, pharmaceutical and aged care.
This multi-pillar approach provides the framework for the MMGPI which considers 
more than 40 indicators in respect of each country’s retirement income system.
PILLAR 0
Benefits of several pillars include risk diversification and efficiency
A basic 
public pension 
that provides a 
minimal level 
of protection
PILLAR 1
A public, 
mandatory and 
contributory system 
linked to earnings
PILLAR 2
A private, 
mandatory and 
fully-funded 
system
PILLAR 3
A voluntary 
and fully-funded 
system
PILLAR 4
Financial and 
non-financial 
support to the 
elderly outside 
pensions
Figure 1 
THE mULTI-PILLAR APPROACH
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Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index
The following diagram highlights some of the topics covered by the MMGPI and 
shows that the overall index is broken down into the following three sub-indices:
•	 Adequacy: The adequacy of benefits is perhaps the most obvious way to 
compare different systems. After all, the primary objective of any pension 
system is to provide adequate retirement income. However adequacy is also 
influenced by many design features of the public and private pension systems.
•	 Sustainability: The long-term sustainability of the existing retirement income 
system is a concern in many countries. This sub-index therefore brings together 
several measures that affect the sustainability of current programs.
•	 Integrity: As most countries are relying on the private system to play an increas-
ingly important role in the provision of retirement income, it is critical that the 
community has confidence in the ability of private sector pension providers to 
deliver retirement benefits over many years into the future. 
Figure 2 
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The following table shows the overall index value for each country together with 
the index value for each of the three sub-indices. Each index value represents a 
score between 0 and 100.
Table 1 
mELbOURNE mERCER GLObAL PENSION INDEX, SHOWING COUNTRy vALUES
country
overall index 
Value
sub-index Values
Adequacy Sustainability Integrity
Denmark 82.4 77.5 86.5 84.5
Australia 79.9 81.2 73.0 87.8
Netherlands 79.2 75.3 76.3 89.4
Finland 74.3 72.2 64.7 91.1
Switzerland 73.9 71.9 69.7 83.1
Sweden 73.4 67.2 74.7 81.6
Canada 69.1 75.0 58.6 74.3
Chile 68.2 57.3 68.7 85.0
UK 67.6 69.8 52.4 85.4
Singapore 65.9 56.4 68.5 77.4
Germany 62.2 75.8 37.6 75.0
Ireland 62.2 77.6 36.0 74.1
USA 57.9 55.2 58.5 61.2
France 57.5 76.4 37.7 54.9
Poland 56.4 61.7 41.4 68.9
South Africa 54.0 48.3 44.6 76.3
Austria 52.8 67.5 18.9 76.6
Brazil 52.4 61.8 26.2 74.2
Italy 49.6 68.1 13.4 70.7
Mexico 49.4 49.9 53.1 43.5
China 49.0 62.5 33.0 49.9
Indonesia 45.2 37.5 37.8 68.0
Japan 44.4 48.0 28.5 60.9
Korea (South) 43.6 42.6 42.5 46.7
India 43.5 37.1 40.6 57.7
average  60.6 63.0 49.7 71.9
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Australia’s performance is very creditable with a second in the overall index built 
upon a first in adequacy, a fourth in sustainability, and a third in integrity. However, 
as is discussed later, this does not suggest that Australia has 
a perfect system. Rather, it suggests we are better placed 
than many other countries, especially in the accumulation (or 
pre-retirement) phase.
In light of this global research, what are the features that 
the better pension systems around the world exhibit? They 
include:
In the adequacy sub-index
•	 A minimum (or base) pension is provided to the poor that represents a rea-
sonable percentage of average earnings in the community. For example, while 
Denmark is more than 35 per cent and Australia is about 28 per cent for a single 
person, both the UK and US are less than 20 per cent.
•	 A net (after tax) replacement rate at retirement for a median income earner who 
has worked full time should be in the order of 70 per cent. Using OECD data, 
the UK and USA are both less than 50 per cent and Singapore is less than 40 
per cent. The Australian figure, which assumes the superannuation guarantee 
increasing to 12 per cent, is 72.8 per cent for a new entrant into the workforce.
•	 The retirement system should require at least half the accumulated retirement 
benefits to be taken as an income stream.
•	 Household savings outside the pension system (which contributes to pillar 4) 
should be at least five per cent of personal disposable income.
In the sustainability sub-index
•	 At least 70 per cent of the working age population should be members of private 
pension plans. Chile, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have more than 
75 per cent coverage whereas Australia is slightly less than 70 per cent.
•	 There should be significant funding of future pension liabilities so that the current 
pension fund assets should be more than 100 per cent of GDP. In fact, both 
Denmark and the Netherlands exceed 150 per cent of GDP. Australia is cur-
rently more than 120 per cent.
•	 The level of current contributions being paid into funded pension schemes 
should be at least eight per cent of earnings. Of course, the appropriate level 
will vary slightly between countries depending on the social security arrange-
ments. Means-tested arrangements, as applies in Australia, require a higher 
level of contributions.
•	 Employment should be encouraged at older ages so that the labour force par-
ticipation rate for those aged 55–64 should be at least 65 per cent. Sweden and 
Switzerland lead the way with 77 per cent and 73 per cent respectively, with 
Australia at 64 per cent.
“ Australia’s performance is very 
creditable...However...this does 
not suggest that Australia has a 
perfect system.”
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In the integrity sub-index
•	 There should be a strong prudential regulator supervising private pension plans.
•	 Trustees or fiduciaries of pension plans should be required to prepare an invest-
ment policy, a risk management policy and a conflicts of interest policy.
•	 There should be clear funding requirements for both defined benefit and defined 
contribution schemes.
•	 There should be requirements for the private pension plans to communicate 
with their members on a regular basis including the provision of personal state-
ments, projected retirement income and an annual report.
In respect of Australia, the 2014 MMGPI report suggested that the overall index 
value could be improved by:
•	 Introducing a requirement that part of each retirement benefit (above a certain 
level) must be taken as an income stream, which could include some longevity 
protection.
•	 Increasing the labour force participation rate among older workers, which is 
gradually happening.
•	 Introducing a mechanism to increase the pension age as life expectancy contin-
ues to increase, thereby removing it from the political process.
•	 Increasing the minimum access age to receive benefits from private pension 
plans so that access to retirement benefits is restricted to no more than five 
years before the Age Pension eligibility age.
An ideal retirement system
Earlier this year, the CFA Institute and Mercer developed 10 principles for an ideal 
retirement system. While these principles were developed for a global audience, 
they also have relevance for Australia.
The following table states each principle and shows how Australia measures up.
principle The australian situation
The government must establish clear objectives 
for the whole retirement system, including 
the complementary roles of each pillar, and 
incorporate the provision of a minimum income to 
alleviate poverty amongst the aged population.
The Financial System Inquiry recommended that 
the objectives of the superannuation system 
should be enshrined in legislation. This would 
represent an important step in obtaining clarity 
and purpose as there are currently no agreed 
objectives.
Table 2 
THE 10 IDEAL RETIREmENT SySTEm PRINCIPLES, AND HOW AUSTRALIA mEASURES UP
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
61
principle The australian situation
There should be cost-effective and attractive 
default arrangements, both before and after 
retirement, for individuals who do not wish to 
make decisions.
MySuper is designed to provide a cost-effective 
default arrangement before retirement but does 
not cover the post-retirement years.
The overall administration and investment costs 
of each pension arrangement should be disclosed 
with some competition present within the system 
to encourage fair pricing.
Costs have to be disclosed to fund members and 
with approximately 100 public offer MySuper 
funds, it is reasonable to conclude that some 
competition is present.
The retirement system must have some flexibility 
as individuals live in a range of personal and 
financial circumstances. This flexibility includes 
recognising that retirement will occur at different 
ages and in different ways across the population.
The Australian system has considerable flexibility 
in the retirement years, with the account-based 
pension the most popular product and no limits 
on capital withdrawals. 
The benefits provided from the system during 
retirement should have an income focus but 
permit some capital payments or withdrawals 
during retirement, but without adversely affecting 
overall adequacy.
Although account-based pensions are the 
most popular form of retirement benefits, the 
Australian system does not have an income 
focus, either during the pre-retirement years or 
after retirement.
Contributions (or accrued benefits) at the required 
minimum level must have immediate vesting and 
portability. These accrued benefits should only 
be accessible under certain conditions, such as 
retirement, death or permanent disability.
Immediate vesting occurs with the SG system and 
most members are able to transfer their accrued 
benefits to another fund. Furthermore, benefits 
are not available until after the preservation age 
which is currently age 56 but increasing to age 
60 by July 2024.
The government should provide taxation support 
to the funded pension system in an equitable and 
sustainable way, thereby providing incentives for 
voluntary savings and compensating individuals 
for the lack of access to their pension savings.
The Australian system receives taxation support 
through reduced taxation on contributions and 
investment earnings for most members. However, 
the fairness of the existing concessions is 
currently being debated.
The governance of pension plans should be 
independent from the government and any 
employer control.
Corporate and industry superannuation funds are 
required to have trustees representing employees 
and employers equally.
The pension system should be subject to 
appropriate regulation including prudential 
regulation of pension plans, communication 
requirements and some protection for pension 
scheme members.
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
has a high level of regulation covering prudential 
and member disclosure requirements. It has also 
established 13 prudential standards for super 
funds. In addition, it meets with each fund’s 
trustees and management on a regular basis.
Table 2 
THE 10 IDEAL RETIREmENT SySTEm PRINCIPLES, AND HOW AUSTRALIA mEASURES UP 
… CONTINUED
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Findings from the Financial System Inquiry
The 2014 Report of the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) identified that one of the 
five weaknesses in Australia’s financial system was that “Superannuation is not 
delivering retirement incomes efficiently”. It went on to highlight that one of its five 
specific themes was to “lift the value of the superannuation system and retirement 
incomes”.
It is not surprising that superannuation was 
a major subject of the Inquiry as superan-
nuation had grown significantly since the 
final report of the previous (Wallis) Inquiry in 
March 1997. In June 1997 (five years after 
the commencement of the SG system), the assets of the superannuation system 
were $321 billion (or about 35 per cent of GDP) compared to the latest figure at 
March 2015 of $2050 billion (or more than 120 per cent of GDP).
The FSI made several recommendations relating to superannuation but the two 
that may have the most long term impact for the structure and development of 
the industry are:
recommendation 9: Seek broad political agreement for, and enshrine in legislation, the objec-
tives of the superannuation system and report publicly on how policy proposals are consistent 
with achieving these objectives over the long term.
recommendation 11: Require superannuation trustees to preselect a comprehensive income 
product for members’ retirement. The product would commence on the member’s instruction, 
or the member may choose to take their benefits in another way.
The development of agreed objectives for Australia’s retirement income system 
would represent a very important step forward. 
It should be noted, I have broadened the concept of objectives beyond superan-
nuation to the overall retirement income system. This is an important distinction 
due to the inter-relationships between superannuation, the means-tested Age 
Pension, and the taxation system. For example, in framing the overall high level 
objectives, it is important to recognise the key role that the Age Pension has in 
poverty alleviation among the aged. In relation to superannuation, its role should 
be to enable most Australians to continue their standard of living in retirement, 
with or without the assistance of the Age Pension, depending on their financial 
situation. However, the extent of tax-supported superannuation should also have 
a cap so that lavish lifestyles are not supported. Of course, the level of this cap 
can be debated but it may be reasonable to cap the support for retirement pen-
sions at about twice the average wage.
Recommendation 11 would provide the Australian system with a stronger focus 
on incomes. This is currently lacking, as noted in the above benchmarking against 
the principles for an ideal retirement system. This development is needed to 
establish a clearer understanding within the community that the primary purpose 
of superannuation is to provide income throughout the retirement years. This 
“ In June 1997, the assets of the superannuation 
system were $321 billion, compared to the 
latest figure at March 2015 of $2050 billion.”
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means we should discourage both the immediate use of the lump sum benefit, 
and the deferred use of the benefit which can lead to significant estate planning.
However, we must also recognise that the financial needs of retirees in the post-
employment years vary significantly. It is much more complex than just paying 
a steady income. For example, many retirees have capital needs for home 
refurbishment, the purchase of a car, or entry into a nursing or aged care home. 
Similarly, their financial needs and state of health can vary considerably. There is 
not one retirement product that suits everybody. In many cases it will be a portfo-
lio or suite of products that provides a regular income, some longevity protection, 
as well as some flexibility. Of course, in many cases, 
the Age Pension will provide some or all of the regular 
income.
Notwithstanding this complexity, a stronger focus 
on income streams would represent an important 
step forward in the maturing of Australia’s retirement 
system. One approach that would begin to engage 
superannuation fund members before retirement 
would be to require all superannuation funds to provide 
members with a projected retirement income, based on their current balance and 
level of contributions.
Conclusions
The Australian retirement system is well regarded on the international scene. We 
have:
•	 A means-tested Age Pension that limits current and future government 
expenditure.
•	 A superannuation system that covers the vast majority of employees and a 
current contribution rate of 9.5 per cent of ordinary time earnings.
•	 A situation where more than 80 per cent of retirement dollars are transferred into 
post-retirement products.
•	 A growing level of superannuation assets, which currently exceed 120 per cent 
of GDP, and are set aside for the future.
However, as the Financial System Inquiry noted, it is possible to improve the 
system and obtain even better value for Australian retirees. With this objective in 
mind, the following changes are recommended:
•	 Confirm the objectives of the retirement income system, which should include:
 –  the alleviation of poverty through the provision of a reasonable pension for 
the poor.
 –  the provision of reasonable retirement incomes to enable most Australians to 
maintain their living standards in retirement.
“ …we must also recognise that the 
financial needs of retirees in the post-
employment years vary significantly…
Similarly, their financial needs and 
state of health can vary considerably.”
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•	 Increase the focus on provision of lifetime retirement incomes so that retirees 
are discouraged from spending their benefits shortly after retirement, or defer-
ring expenditure in the interests of estate planning.
•	 Ensure that all contributions to superannuation clearly lead to an improved 
benefit in retirement.
•	 Provide continued support and encouragement for workers to remain in the 
labour force and not to retire early, wherever practical.
•	 Ensure that the total cost of government support over individuals’ lifetimes in 
respect of retirement income (whether through the Age Pension or superannua-
tion tax concessions, or a combination) should be relatively level, irrespective 
of income.
•	 Ensure that the inter-relationships between superannuation, the Age Pension, 
and taxation are transparent and consistent with the overall objectives.
In conclusion, we want Australians to be able to retire with dignity, and maintain 
it over many years. This means that the benefits must be adequate; the system 
must be sustainable over the longer term; the system must be perceived to be 
fair and, above all, simple to understand. These characteristics will also encour-
age long term community confidence.
Australia is well placed to develop a firs-class world-leading retirement system 
that can provide adequate and sustainable benefits in a well regulated system. 
However, we are not there yet and more work needs to be done. In particular, 
we must focus on developing improved retirement products that provide some 
longevity protection (either through a pooled longevity product or an annuity); a 
regular income; and some flexibility of capital payments, thereby recognising retir-
ees’ differing needs.
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4  Living income- and  
asset-poor in retirement 
 Dr Judith Yates
Australia’s Age Pension is premised on outright 
home ownership and asset-based welfare. 
Retired pensioners who rent privately are at risk of 
experiencing unacceptably high levels of housing 
stress and after-housing poverty. And their numbers 
are only going to grow.
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Introduction
An acquaintance of mine, Tom (not his real name) is now a relatively healthy 
80-year-old. He spent much of his retirement passing on the skills developed in 
his younger years as an A-grade sportsman to the next generation of players. 
He coached on a volunteer basis, using his pensioner concession card on 
public transport to make the one hour journey. His activity has contributed to the 
broader community and kept him mentally alert and physically fitter than he other-
wise would have been. 
But this year he had to stop – not because of age, but because he was evicted 
from his home of 30 years.
Tom spent his working life as a self-employed tradesman earning a modest 
income. He never partnered and never bought his own home. He chose, instead, 
the convenience of renting in an inner city suburb with good access to available 
work. The little discretionary income he had while working, he had saved for 
retirement. However, he made what turned out to be a series of poor investment 
choices and, at the end of his working life, was left with virtually no assets. He is 
now fully dependent on the Age Pension. His run-down, one bedroom apartment 
was only just affordable because of Commonwealth Rent Assistance. 
Dr Judith yates is currently an honorary associate in the School of 
Economics at the University of Sydney after more than 40 years in 
academia. Her primary research interests are in housing economics, 
finance and policy. She produced background papers for the 
Australian Financial System Inquiry in the 1980s, for the Australian 
Government’s National Housing Strategy in the 1990s, and was a member of the National 
Housing Supply Council in the 2000s. She has served on numerous advisory committees 
and boards, including the board of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
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This year, Tom’s landlord decided to sell out to a developer and Tom was given 
three months’ notice. He was unable to find suitable affordable accommodation 
in the city where he had lived since childhood. As a result, he had to move out of 
the capital – away from his community, away from his support network, and away 
from the medical services he will need in the future.
Tom’s story is that of a significant number of older people today although, for 
several reasons, it is more typical of women than men. Women live longer 
than men. They tend to have broken careers, lower lifetime incomes and lower 
capacities for accumulating future income via superan-
nuation, or wealth via residential property. Women are 
more likely to have been responsible for unpaid work 
within the household and, if separated or divorced, are 
more likely to have had primary responsibility for chil-
dren. They face childcare constraints in gaining access 
to employment, and once in paid work, they tend to 
be paid less than men. Women are over-represented 
in low-paid jobs. 
Their stories, and the stories of men such as Tom, are 
well documented in the literature.1 They are the stories 
of vulnerable people who reach retirement with few assets and are primarily reliant 
on the Age Pension. They are what the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) clas-
sifies as persons in low economic resource (LER) households – income- and 
asset-poor households who are at risk of experiencing high levels of economic 
hardship.2 Among other things, this means not being able to heat their homes, 
going without meals, and not being able to afford leisure or hobby activities. 
Income- and asset-poor households are likely to have relatively little choice in 
relation to the key housing attributes valued by older people, including privacy 
and autonomy, affordability, security of tenure, safety, adaptability for future care, 
location, suitability, size, amenity and space.3 
This chapter focusses on the implications for LER households of a system in 
which retirement incomes and living standards rely on an Age Pension that is pre-
mised on outright home ownership and on asset-based welfare.4 
“ …income- and asset-poor households 
who are at risk of experiencing high 
levels of economic hardship. …not 
being able to heat their homes, going 
without meals, and not being able to 
afford leisure or hobby activities.”
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What is income- and asset-poor in retirement?
In Australia in 2011–12, only 15 per cent of the 1.9 million older households 
were LER households, less than 300,000 in total. More than 70 per cent had low 
incomes, but fewer than 18 per cent were asset-poor.5 See Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1 
OLDER HOUSEHOLDS by TENURE AND INCOmE qUINTILE
Table 2 
OLDER HOUSEHOLDS by INCOmE AND NET WEALTH, 2011–12 
no. % no. % no. % no. % 
Q1 596,000 38 43,000 35 113,000 63 752,000 40 
Q2 501,000 32 48,000 39 49,000 27 599,000 32 
Q3 238,000 15 21,000 16 12,000 7 271,000 14 
Q4 145,000 9 8000 6 3000 2 156,000 8 
Q5 104,000 7 5000 4 1000 1 110,000 6 
All incomes 1,584,000 100 124,000 100 180,000 100 1,888,000 100 
Source: ABS Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Findings based on use of basic confidentialised unit record files
equivalised 
disposable  
income  
quintile
equivalised net wealth quintile
NWQ1 NWQ2 NWQ3 NWQ4 NWQ5 TOTAL 
No. of households
Q1 119,000 69,000 197,000 234,000 133,000 752,000 
Q2 52,000 52,000 136,000 205,000 154,000 599,000 
Q3 13,000 16,000 41,000 75,000 126,000 271,000 
Q4 3000 7000 15,000 30,000 101,000 156,000 
Q5 – – 3000 8000 99,000 110,000 
All older h’holds 187,000 143,000 392,000 552,000 614,000 1,888,000 
Source: ABS Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Findings based on use of basic confidentialised unit record files
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Income-poor
In 2011–12, an income below $34,000 for a single person and below $51,000 
for a couple resulted in a household being classified as income-poor. These 
LER incomes are above the full Age Pension and above the (marginally higher) 
incomes the Association for Superannuation Funds Australia (ASFA) considers 
sufficient for a healthy, home-owning older household to maintain a ‘modest’ 
standard of living. 
Even after adjusting for inflation, they are considerably less than incomes needed 
for a ‘comfortable’ lifestyle in 2014 – estimated at $43,000 for a single person 
and $58,000 for a couple.6 ASFA considers that a modest retirement lifestyle 
allows retirees to afford only fairly basic activities; a comfortable retirement life-
style enables them to have a good standard of living.7
Asset-poor 
The total net wealth levels used by the ABS to define asset-poor households in 
2011–12 were less than $200,000 for single persons, and less than $300,000 for 
couples, regardless of whether or not they owned their own home. 
Based on a 7 per cent return, ASFA estimates that a home-owning couple at age 
70 needed just over $500,000 in 2014 (and a single person more than $400,000) 
to ensure a ‘comfortable’ lifestyle in retirement over a 20 year expected life-span.8 
However, at current low rates of return, more than twice these amounts have 
been suggested as necessary for generating an income stream equivalent to the 
current Age Pension.9 
Who is affected?
These estimates of what is required for a comfortable, or even a modest, stan-
dard of retirement living are based on the ‘average’ household whose members 
are in good health and, importantly, own their own home. 
‘Average’, however, does not describe the characteristics of the 15 per cent of 
older households who are income- and asset-poor. The vast majority of these 
are renters, not home owners – a predictable outcome given the significant con-
tribution that housing wealth makes to total net wealth. They are less likely than 
home owners to be healthy (particularly in relation to mental health).10 More than 
70 per cent of renter households are single adult households. Of these, most are 
women. 
Currently, public rental housing accommodates many of these people. But, in 
2011–12, more than one third of older LER renters were in the private rather than 
the public rental system.11 See Table 3 and Table 4. 
However, private rental housing often does not meet older renters’ needs. 
Older renters are far more likely to experience persistent poverty than other 
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Table 3 
LOW ECONOmIC RESOURCE HOUSEHOLDS by AGE AND TENURE, 2011–12
Table 4 
OLDER LOW ECONOmIC RESOURCE HOUSEHOLDS by TENURE, 2011–12
Tenure
age
all ler  
h’holds<25 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
public renters  31,000  71,000  88,000  84,000  93,000  144,000  511,000 
private renters  79,000  183,000  179,000  101,000  77,000  84,000  703,000 
all renters  110,000  254,000  267,000  184,000  171,000  228,000  1,214,000 
home owners  3000  87,000  103,000  70,000  40,000  63,000  366,000 
all LER hholds  112,000  341,000  371,000  254,000  210,000  292,000  1,580,000 
Source: ABS Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Findings based on use of basic confidentialised unit record files
net worth  
quintile
Tenure
Disposable income quintle
Q1 Q2 Q1+Q2
No. % No. % No. %
nWQ1 owner with no mortgage  1000  0  3000  3  3000  1 
owner with a mortgage –  0 – – –  0 
public renter  89,000  47  22,000  22  111,000  38 
private renter  30,000  16  27,000  26  56,000  19 
nWQ2 owner with no mortgage  36,000  19  12,000  11  47,000  16 
owner with a mortgage  5000  3  7000  7  13,000  4 
public renter  17,000  9  16,000  16  33,000  11 
private renter  11,000  6  17,000  16  27,000  9 
nWQ1+nWQ2 owner with no mortgage  36,000  19  14,000  14  51,000  17 
owner with a mortgage  6000  3  7000  7  13,000  4 
public renter  106,000  56  39,000  37  144,000  50 
private renter  41,000  22  43,000  42  84,000  29 
all ler older households  188,000  100  103,000  100  292,000 100
Source: ABS Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Findings based on use of basic confidentialised unit record files
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households.12 They generally rent in the private market, by necessity rather than 
choice, and they are most at risk of becoming homeless for the first time.13 Too 
often private rental is unaffordable. When it is affordable, it is often not appropri-
ate in terms of design or access to services. As metropolitan housing markets 
have been restructured over the last few decades, low cost rental accommoda-
tion has been pushed to the urban fringes, 
constraining growing numbers of older LER 
renters to locations that are poorly serviced 
by public transport, community services, and 
health services. With frequent rent increases and 
no security of tenure, private rental can create 
anxiety.14 
The budget standards used to determine the income needed to sustain either 
modest or comfortable lifestyles, are based on owners’ housing costs, not those 
of renters. For a couple (in 2014) they were calculated at almost $70 per week 
for a modest lifestyle and $90 for a comfortable lifestyle. For a single person they 
are much the same. However, the number of private rental dwellings with rents 
this low has declined steadily over time. Low-income renters, young or old, are 
often unable to compete for the extremely limited (generally non-metropolitan) 
supply that exists. This results in a significant and increasing shortage of afford-
able private rental dwellings available for low-income households, particularly in 
metropolitan areas.15 
The resultant incidence of housing stress and after-housing poverty is unaccept-
ably high for older, lower-income private renters.16 Income-poor home owners, 
on the other hand, are largely protected from after-housing poverty because the 
wealth they hold in owner-occupied housing protects them from high housing 
costs.
The relative economic status of renters 
The role of housing in making a major contribution to retirees’ living standards is 
widely recognised. But Australia is seen as unusual in the prominence we give it.17
One reason is Australia’s high rate of home ownership among older households. 
In 2011–12, 84 per cent of older households were home owners, compared with 
an OECD average of around 75 per cent. This puts Australia in the top 25 per 
cent of OECD countries for which comparable data is readily available.18 At the 
same time, it ranks last among these OECD countries in terms of the relative 
incomes of over 65s, compared with the national average. The overall poverty 
rate of older people in Australia is three times the OECD average, and one of the 
highest. Australia ranks towards the bottom in terms of the share of retirement 
income coming from the Age Pension and, conversely, towards the top in terms 
of the share of retirement income that comes from private pensions and non-
pension assets – that is, from its asset-based welfare system.19 
“ The budget standards used to determine the 
income needed to sustain either modest or 
comfortable lifestyles, are based on owners’ 
housing costs, not those of renters.”
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High home ownership rates among older households contribute to a lack of 
concern about older renters. Indeed, current concerns in rich OECD countries 
(including Australia) are more often about how older asset-rich households can 
increase their living standards by turning their housing assets into income.20 Older 
renters do not have this option. They are disadvantaged compared with owners 
probably because, for most of their lives, they are also likely to have been less 
advantaged than their home-owning counterparts. 
In every age group, renters have average incomes that are systematically lower 
than those of owner-occupiers. See Figure 1. While it does not necessarily follow 
that households who are disadvantaged at a particular point in their life-cycle 
will be disadvantaged throughout their whole lives, there are numerous indica-
tions that this is a likely outcome.21 Likewise, renters may not always have been 
renters, but a significant and growing proportion are shown to have been renters 
for a long time.22 
Figure 1 
EqUIvALISED HOUSEHOLD DISPOSAbLE INCOmE by AGE AND TENURE, 2011–12 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Results derived from ABS Basic CURF data.
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Figure 2  
HOUSEHOLD EqUIvALISED NET WORTH by AGE AND TENURE, 2011–12: AUSTRALIA 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Results derived from ABS Basic CURF data.
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Lower incomes and lower wealth both reduce capacity to accumulate wealth. 
Income-related contributions to tax-advantaged compulsory superannuation 
illustrate one relationship between income and wealth accumulation. Income and 
deposit constraints that limit borrowing capacity and access to tax-advantaged 
housing assets, illustrate the dual constraint of income and wealth on the capac-
ity to accumulate wealth. These constraints contribute to disparities in net wealth 
between owners and renters that are far greater than disparities in income. For 
younger households, owners’ net wealth is around twice that of renters. For older 
households, owners’ net wealth is around six times higher than that of renters. 
See Figure 2. The process of intergenerational transmission of wealth through 
inheritance is likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing inequalities.23 
Housing wealth is one of the primary sources of these disparities. The extent of 
current housing wealth in Australia results largely from the significant growth in 
real dwelling prices that began in the mid-1980s. Some 40 years on, despite a 
number of market shocks, this growth has yet to run out of steam. The greatest 
beneficiaries of this long-run dwelling price growth are those who owned their 
dwellings before 1985, followed closely by those who have purchased since. The 
greatest losers are renters excluded from home purchase. 
Renters not only have lower holdings of housing wealth (by definition they have 
no owner-occupied housing wealth) but they also have considerably lower hold-
ings of other forms of wealth. See Figure 3.
In the ten years before people turn 65, when their superannuation wealth is likely 
to be at its maximum, the average superannuation wealth of renters (adjusted for 
household size) is less than 40 per cent of the average superannuation wealth of 
home owners. At less than $70,000, this is well below the level presumed neces-
sary to sustain even a modest lifestyle in retirement. During their working lives, the 
lower average incomes of renters mean they have less capacity to contribute to 
superannuation or, indeed, to accumulate any other form of wealth. 
Figure 3 
ALLOCATION OF EqUIvALISED NET WORTH by AGE AND TENURE, 2011–12: AUSTRALIA
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing, 2011–12. Results derived from ABS Basic CURF data.
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For renter households in the pre-retirement age group, average total net wealth is 
less than one quarter that of home owners. After age 65, their average total net 
wealth compares even less favourably.24 An asset-based welfare system provides 
no comfort to the majority of older renter households.
What of the future?
Since the early 2000s, the Australian Government has used a series of 
Intergenerational Reports to assess the sustainability of current and/or proposed 
fiscal policies for the 40 years ahead. These reports have examined the impli-
cations of long-term demographic and economic growth trends on Australian 
Government spending.25 They reflect a concern with future living standards. They 
are seen as an important means of focusing public attention on Australia’s longer 
term challenges of maintaining and improving living standards, and of stimulating 
policy adjustments in order to do so. 
Each of the four Intergenerational Reports released to date has examined the 
impact of projected trends on the main items of government expenditure, includ-
ing measures intended to enhance retirement incomes, and to reduce reliance 
on the Age Pension. The 2015 Intergenerational Report explicitly acknowledges 
three pillars of Australia’s retirement income system: the Age Pension, compul-
sory superannuation, and voluntary saving. However, as with previous reports, it 
neglects the critical role played by a fourth pillar in protecting the living standards 
of older Australians – that of owner-occupied housing.26 
All reports have ignored the impact of current poli-
cies, and of economic and demographic trends, on 
older households’ present and future housing out-
comes. This might be explained by two current facts: 
(i) relatively few older households do not own their 
own home; and (ii), public rental housing partially 
protects the living standards of many of those who 
do not own. 
However, for reasons discussed below, the number of older income- and asset-
poor households is likely to grow rapidly over the next 40 years and many of 
these are likely to be in the private rental market. 
“ …the number of older income- and 
asset-poor households is likely to grow 
rapidly over the next 40 years and 
many of these are likely to be in the 
private rental market.” 
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
75
Population growth and ageing
The first reason is simple: Australia’s population is growing and ageing. Current 
projections suggest the number of Australians aged 65 years or older will more 
than double in the next 40 years.27 If the proportion of older households living 
independently as renters remains the same as it has for the past 40 years, then 
in 2054 the number of older renters will also more than double – from around 
300,000 households in 2014, to more than 600,000. If the proportion of older 
LER households remains the same, most of these older renters will be income- 
and asset-poor. 
The following reasons are more insidious: it is likely that the assumptions made in 
these simple projections provide too conservative an estimate of the numbers of 
older LER households forecast to face future hardship in the private rental market.
Decline of affordable rental housing 
Social rental housing
The first of these conservative assumptions relates to the changing structure of 
Australia’s rental system. Currently, most income- and asset-poor older renters 
are in the public rental system.28 However, since the mid-1990s, the absolute 
number of dwellings in public rental has declined by 50 per cent to 4 per cent of 
Australia’s total dwelling stock.29 See Figure 4. 
Moreover, current social housing allocation criteria place mental illness, addiction 
issues, physical disability, and domestic violence ahead of housing affordability 
problems. While this policy remains, future generations of older LER households 
are less likely to access social rental dwellings. Thus, as the number of renters 
increases, a growing share will end up in the private rental market. If there is no 
increase in the number of social rental dwellings available for older households, 
the share of LER older households in the private rental market could increase 
from a current share of less than two out of every five renter households, to 
almost seven out of every 10.30 
Figure 4 
SOCIAL RENTAL DWELLINGS, 1990 TO 2015
Source: updated from Yates (2013, p116) op.cit.
Number of dwellings
Total social dwellings (left hand side)
Social share all dwellings (right hand side)
%
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
0
2
4
6
8
T h e  s u p e r  c h a l l e n g e  o f  r e T i r e m e n T  i n c o m e  p o l i c y
76
Private rental housing
The private rental market, however, is ill-prepared to cope with this growth. There 
have been significant and growing shortages of dwellings that are affordable for 
low income renters.31 Despite a growing number of low income households, the 
stock of low rent dwellings has been steadily declining for more than a genera-
tion. See Figure 5. 
A shortage of affordable and available rental dwellings for low income renters 
means older LER renters are less likely to be able to find dwellings that meet 
their needs. This increases their risks of facing both non-economic and economic 
hardship. In the absence of significant policy change, the likelihood is that short-
ages will continue over the next 40 years or so. In the future, this will exacerbate 
the affordability problems and other issues faced by older private renters. 
Declining home ownership
The second of the conservative assumptions made (in estimating a doubling of 
the number of older renters by 2054) is that the proportion of older renters will 
remain at 15 per cent – that is, the same over the next 40 years as it has been 
over the past 40 years. 
This presumes the home ownership rate of over 65s will remain at 85 per cent. 
It also presumes that home ownership rates of those currently under 65 will be 
sustained at levels that gave rise to the current rate for those over 65. But this 
is unlikely. Since the 1990s or even earlier, economic and demographic factors 
have pushed dwelling prices to a point where first home buyers face significant 
affordability constraints. As a result, for well over 30 years, there have been signif-
icant reductions in home ownership rates among successive cohorts of younger 
households.32 See Figure 6. 
Figure 5 
PRIvATE RENTAL DWELLINGS, 1996 TO 2011
Source: Hulse et al. (2014, p19), op.cit. 
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Figure 6 
AGE-SPECIFIC HOmE OWNERSHIP RATES, 1991 TO 2011
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing (stated years) customised data (excludes records where tenure 
not stated)
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Table 5 
PROJECTIONS OF OLDER RENTER HOUSEHOLDS by AGE GROUPS, 2008 TO 2028, SELECTED yEARS
age of reference 
person 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028
65–74 Private renter 79,600 105,700 137,000 158,500 184,700
Public renter 46,500 62,200 81,700 94,700 110,700
Total renters 126,100 167,800 218,700 253,200 295,300
75–84 Private renter 52,200 54,000 62,000 84,300 108,700
Public renter 31,800 32,200 36,600 49,600 64,100
Total renters 84,000 86,200 98,600 133,800 172,900
85+ years Private renter 14,400 18,600 20,900 23,100 28,000
Public renter 8100 10,400 11,500 12,500 15,000
Total renters 22,500 29,000 32,300 35,700 43,100
All households  
aged 65  
and over 
Private renter 146,200 178,200 219,900 265,900 321,400
Public renter 86,500 104,800 129,700 156,800 189,800
Total renters 232,600 283,000 349,600 422,700 511,300
Source: National Housing Supply Council projections based on McDonald–Temple household growth scenarios.
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These declines have been most pronounced for households in the bottom two 
income distribution quintiles. See Figure 7.33 Some of the more recent declines 
for relatively affluent younger households are offset by a small proportion who are 
renters, but who have become first-time purchasers as landlords.34 
As each cohort moves through middle-age and into retirement, it is unlikely home 
ownership rates can fully recover from their current 30+ year lows. Income and 
net wealth data (in Figures 1 and 2) suggests that, without considerable assis-
tance from intergenerational wealth transfers, households who do not become 
home owners while relatively young are unlikely to have sufficient economic 
resources to change their tenure status as they age. If this is the case, an 
increased proportion of households will reach retirement without the protection 
provided by the fourth pillar of Australia’s retirement income system, and without 
the social rental housing safety net. These households will be forced to rely on the 
private rental market.
Increasing inequality
The third of the conservative assumptions made is that the proportion of income- 
and asset-poor households in rental housing will remain constant. Since the early 
1980s, despite an overall growth in household incomes, there has been a clear 
trend of rising income inequality. Wealth inequality has also risen, particularly 
because of increased wealth of the very rich.35 
Increasing income and wealth inequality are likely to mean that advantaged 
households will increasingly squeeze disadvantaged households out of property 
ownership. This is already happening in some markets – investors, who tend to 
have greater borrowing capacity than first home buyers, add to price pressures 
and squeeze out less advantaged first home buyers.36 
Figure 7 
HOmE OWNERSHIP RATES by INCOmE FOR yOUNGER HOUSEHOLDS, 1988 TO 2011
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Surveys of Income and Housing, years indicated. Results derived from ABS Basic CURF data
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What might be done about it?
Housing makes a critical contribution to sustaining the living standards of older 
households who are income-poor but asset-rich in retirement. Hence, the chal-
lenge of how to ensure the living standards of those who are income-poor and 
asset-poor must start with housing. 
Experience suggests that many households are at risk of experiencing high levels 
of economic hardhip if they have to rely on the private rental market to meet their 
retirement housing needs. This suggests the most critical response is to reverse 
the decline in the supply of affordable rental housing, in particular, the declining 
share of social rental housing.37 
Increasing or restructuring Commonwealth Rent Assistance to ensure that retire-
ment income is adequate to cover rental costs may provide a short-term or 
stop-gap solution. However, it is unlikely to provide a long-term solution unless 
there is a simultaneous increase in the supply of affordable rental housing. Without 
this, any increased rent assistance will simply be passed through to increased 
rents. It is important to increase the supply of affordable housing that is suitable 
for older households, and to ensure that it remains suitable and affordable.
A more fundamental set of solutions might focus on the 
difficult task of improving housing affordability in general. 
Current and past inquiries into housing affordability provide 
an overview of the broad range of potentially viable policies 
that would work both by increasing the supply of housing 
to meet the needs of new households, and by reducing 
demand for housing from existing households.38 Many 
policy ideas, such as increased infrastructure provision 
(potentially funded through value capture), lie outside of 
what is generally regarded as ‘housing’ policy. Many others often appear too 
politically difficult and are set aside. These include the options of extending land 
tax to include owner-occupied housing; including the family home in the assets 
test; re-assessing the current tax treatment of housing (including negative gearing 
and the discount on the capital gains tax for investors, or the exemption of owner-
occupied housing from the capital gains tax); and the introduction of a wealth or 
inheritance tax.
Australia could make a fundamental shift towards redistributive policies with the 
capacity to reduce the growing intra- and inter-generational inequalities in income 
and wealth that contribute to the loss of control over older people’s lives. Unless it 
does so, the retirement living standards of income- and asset-poor households – 
people like Tom – are unlikely to improve. 
“ It is important to increase the 
supply of affordable housing that is 
suitable for older households, and 
to ensure that it remains suitable 
and affordable.” 
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